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THE NEW SLOVAK LANGUAGE LAW: 
INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL POLITICS ?1 
 
Farimah Daftary and Kinga Gál2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, where language is the central defining element 
of the ethnic group, language policy becomes the cornerstone of constructing 
the identity of new states. In the multiethnic state or plural democratic state, 
policies aimed at promoting the language of the titular nation become the 
primary means of validating the moral worth of one ethnic group over the 
others. The example of independent Slovakia illustrates the political 
importance of language in Central and Eastern Europe and the virulence of the 
conflicts which arise between majorities and minorities over language issues. 
The continuous disputes between the Slovak leadership and the Hungarian 
minority over minority issues in general, and language-related issues 
specifically, have shown how sensitive language demands are during the early 
phases of state-building. In Slovakia, where the emphasis was on the ethnic 
rather than the civic dimension of nationhood, language policy served a two-
fold purpose: by giving the Slovak language a dominant position in the state, it 
sought to foster Slovak ethnic identity as the identity of the Slovak nation-state; 
and it was at the same time a method for promoting the assimilation of non-
ethnic Slovak citizens. In reality, anti-minority policies in Slovakia (or policies 
perceived as such) fell within a broader set of anti-opposition policies as the 
State attempted to extend control and establish moral monopoly over not only 
language but also the fields of culture, education, economy, etc.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, where language is the central defining element of the 
ethnic group, language policy becomes the cornerstone of constructing the identity of 
new states (Schöpflin 1996: 6).  In the multiethnic state or plural democratic state 
(Lijphart 1977),3 policies aimed at promoting the language of the titular nation 
become the primary means of validating the moral worth of one ethnic group over the 
                                               
1 This paper was presented at an ECMI panel “Language Laws: Nation-Building, Ethnic Containment 
or Diversity Management ?” at the fifth annual convention of the Association for the Study of 
Nationalities (ASN) (New York, 13-15 April 2000). 
2 Farimah Daftary and Dr. Kinga Gál are Research Associates at the European Centre for Minority 
Issues (ECMI) in Flensburg, Germany. 
3 A plural democratic state is a state composed of more than one minority or ethnic group and which is 
governed by a democratic political system.  
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others.  Thus, language is not only an instrument o f communication between 
individuals but it is elevated to the symbolic level; it becomes a political statement of 
loyalty towards the new state as well as a moral act of support towards the cultural 
community that it represents. 
 
In the early stages of nation-formation, it is easier for an ethnic group to define what it 
is not than what it is (Connor 1994). Ultimately, the nation should be self-defined 
rather than other-defined; however, until then, minorities have an important function 
to serve in this process as the “other”.  In the early stages of state-building, to speak a 
language other than that of the titular nation may be interpreted as an act of disloyalty 
and perceived as a threat to the fledgling identity of the state.  This is particularly true 
when state-building is accompanied by a belated completion of the nation-building 
process.  Members of the minority should therefore be made into “loyal citizens” by 
being made to speak the state language, otherwise they could be excluded from the 
state-building process.  This is particularly true where the aim is to build a nation-
state, regardless of multiethnic and multilingual realities, and where the language of 
the titular nation is declared the sole state language and plays a dominant and 
integrating role in all aspects of political, social and cultural life. 
 
Minority demands, and in particular demands for minority language rights, will be 
perceived as a threat to the integrity of the state until political leaders grow more 
secure about the identity and stability of the new state.  According to the taxonomy 
developed by McGarry and O’Leary (1993:4), state policies towards minorities seek 
either to eliminate or to manage differences.  The former aim may be achieved 
through integration/forced assimilation, partition and/or secession (self-
determination), forced mass population transfers, and genocide.  The latter aim, 
management of differences, may be achieved by methods based on the notion of 
hegemonic control, consociation, arbitration (third party inte rvention) and 
cantonisation and/or federalisation.  A combination of methods may be used: for 
example in a state which does not recognise the legitimacy of minority demands, a 
combination of forced assimilation and hegemonic control of the remaining members 
of the ethnic community may be applied.  Minority policies may be further subdivided 
into territorial and non-territorial ones. An example of a non-territorial coercive 
 3
minority policy is assimilation through the imposition of standard cultural codes, 
discrimination against the minority’s cultural and educational system, the prohibition 
of the use of the minority language in schools and in official communication, etc. 
Gerrymandering is an example of a territorial coercive policy aimed at preventing 
minorities from gaining regional territorial control.  
 
What types of linguistic models are chosen? Many of the new post-communist 
regimes have opted for the “One State - One Language” policy in order to establish 
the primacy of the language of the titular nation over that of other ethnic groups in the 
country, especially when these have historically been the cultural coloniser (Russian 
in Ukraine or Czech and Hungarian in Slovakia). If we look at  recent developments 
in Central and Eastern Europe, we see particularly interesting attempts at highlighting 
the distinction between nations by creating artificial distinctions between a common 
language.4 Different models and theories exist concerning the relationship between 
nation, state and language (Hutchinson and Smith 1994: 19). What status, then, is 
accorded minority languages?  One can observe a variety of models, from unilingual 
ones where one language (usually that of a titular nation), enjoys the status of state 
language and other languages traditionally spoken in the state enjoy no legal status; to 
states where, in addition to the state language, a second language is granted equal 
state status, or a lower status (for example, as an official language or even as a 
“language of inter-ethnic communication”).5  A particular dilemma faced by newly 
independent states is how to restore the status of the national language and ensure that 
all citizens have a proper knowledge of it while at the same time respecting the 
language rights of minorities.  These at times seemingly conflicting imperatives are 
recognised at least by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities who, in a 
1995 letter to then Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk, wrote that: “[… ] in states 
with national minorities, the question inevitably arises how to find a balance between 
the right of a state to ensure that the position of the state language is safeguarded and 
                                               
4 For e.g., the artificial creation of Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian, or Moldovan as opposed to 
Romanian (cf. special issue of Transition devoted to “Language and Ethnicity”, Transition 2: 24, 29 
November 1996). 
5 These distinctions have become quite common in the post-communist states.  In 1994 in Ukraine, for 
example, President Kuchma introduced a distinction between state and official languages: Ukrainian 
was the sole state language but other languages could be granted official status in regions where they 
were widely spoken.  In Kazakhstan, the 1995 Constitution elevated Russian to the status of an official 
language while keeping Kazak as the sole state language 
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the need to ensure that the languages of the national minorities are protected in 
accordance with international standards.”6           
 
The example of independent Slovakia illustrates the political importance of language 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the virulence of the conflicts which arise between 
majorities and minorities over language issues (Harlig 1997).  The continuous 
disputes between the Slovak leadership and the Hungarian minority over minority 
issues in general, and language-related issues specifically, have shown how sensitive 
language demands are during the early phases of state-building.  Once they had parted 
from their former dominant partner within Czechoslovakia in 1993, the Slovak leaders 
sought to assert Slovak national identity in opposition to that of the “old enemy”— the 
Hungarians— a  minority of whom also happened to live in the country.  In Slovakia, 
where the emphasis was on the ethnic rather than the civic dimension of nationhood, 
language policy served a two-fold purpose: by giving the Slovak language a dominant 
position in the state, it sought to foster Slovak ethnic identity as the identity of the 
Slovak nation-state; and it was at the same time a method for promoting the 
assimilation of non-ethnic Slovak citizens.  Whilst Slovak leaders attempted to justify 
restrictive language policies by the imperatives of nation-building and consolidating 
the identity of the state, the Hungarian minority perceived these policies as specific 
attacks against minority identity and culture, and against theirs especially.  In reality, 
anti-minority policies in Slovakia (or policies perceived as such) fell within a broader 
set of anti-opposition policies as the state attempted to extend control and establish 
moral monopoly over not only language but also the fields of culture, education, 
economy, etc. 
 
Rather than recognising the loyalty of the Hungarian minority to the state and 
accepting it as one of the constituent elements of the multiethnic state, the nationalist -
populist coalition governments of Vladimír Meciar (1992-1994, 1994-1998) sought to 
build a Slovak nation-state and exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions by claiming that the 
demands of the Hungarian minority were unjustified, thereby diverting attention from 
badly-needed economic reforms.  Several legal acts affecting minority language use 
                                               
6 Letter of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, sent to Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj 
Schenk on 24 August 1995 (at: http://www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/index.html).  
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were adopted during this period, each causing even more confusion and discontent 
both on the domestic and international levels.  Ever since the adoption of the 
restrictive Law on the State Language in 1995, pressure had been on Slovakia, both 
domestically by the Hungarian minority and internationally, to adopt a law regulating 
the use of minority languages.  Slovakia’s government was called upon to respect its 
commitments in the field of minority rights in line with its membership of the Council 
of Europe (CoE), but also according to the provisions of the Slovak -Hungarian Basic 
Treaty signed in March 1995.  The country as a whole paid the price for the 
intransigence of the Meciar government on the minority issue, and for undemocratic 
government in general, by being excluded from the first round of European Union 
(EU) negotiations and by becoming a sort of pariah in the international community.  
 
In the September 1998 elections, the Meciar government was defeated by a broad left-
right coalition which formed a new government with the participation, for the first 
time since independence, of ethnic Hungarian parties.  The new government of Prime 
Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda showed its eagerness to integrate Slovakia into European 
structures.  This bode well for the future of minority policies in general, and language 
policies in particular.  On 10 July 1999, after an intense debate, the Slovak Parliament 
rushed through a law on the use of minority languages.  The new law was welcomed 
by the international community and Slovakia was invited at the European Council 
Summit in Helsinki in December 1999 to begin EU accession talks.   
 
However, this paper will seek to demonstrate that there are problems with both the 
standards contained in the new bill as well as with the process behind its adoption.  In 
order to understand why such a law was passed, we must look at both internal and 
external politics by placing this law within the broader context of the role of language 
policy in nation-building as well as Slovakia’s international relations.  In the first 
section, we shall present an overview of the ethno-linguistic make-up of Slovakia, the 
legacy of history, minority concerns, as well as of the Slovak party system.  In a 
second section, we shall look into the role of language and language policy under 
previous Slovak governments.  The period 1992-1998 can be characterised as a phase 
of intense nation-(state-)building and of coercive minority policies, especially in the 
field of language, building on measures already taken in 1990-1992 before the HZDS 
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came to power in June 1992.  In the third section, we shall present the process behind 
the adoption of the 1999 law by the new coalition government, and highlight the main 
disagreements and immediate domestic reactions to its adoption.  In the fourth 
section, we shall analyse the standards contained in the 1999 law and the extent to 
which they fulfilled the expectations of international organisations (CoE, EU and the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe— OSCE).  In the concluding 
section, we shall offer some thoughts on the impact of this new law on inter-ethnic 
relations in Slovakia and on prospects for Slovakia’s “return to Europe” and the  
management of ethnic differences within the framework of a plural democratic state.  
 
 7
II. BACKGROUND 
 
1. The Ethno-linguistic Make-up of Slovakia 
 
Slovakia is a multiethnic state of 5.3 million inhabitants where officially 14.3 % of the 
population declared an ethnicity other than Slovak.  This is a minimum figure, and the 
proportion of non -ethnic Slovaks may be as high as 21-22%.  There is no legal 
definition of the term “national minority” in Slovak legislation nor are they specified.  
According to the most recent official data derived from the 1991 Czechoslovak 
census,7 there are 11 national minorities in the Slovak Republic, with three groups 
representing 1% or more of  the Slovak population. The largest is the Hungarian 
minority (10.6% of the Slovak population), followed by the Roma (1.6%), Czechs 
(1%), and Ruthenians (or “Rusyns” which is the term currently used by members of 
this group) and Ukrainians (0.3% each). Other minorities (Germans, 
Moravians/Silesians, Croats, Jews, Poles, Bulgarians, etc) number less than 7,000 
persons.  Some (Hungarian) sources place the number of ethnic Hungarians closer to 
700,000 (Minority Rights Group 1997: 246).  Also, as in other East European 
countries, it is estimated that the number of Roma is much higher, between 350,000 
and 520,000 or 6.5-9.7% of the population (Minority Rights Group 1997: 246; 
(Liégeois and Gheorghe 1995: 7),8 which would make the Roma minority almost as 
large as the Hungarian one. 
 
A total of about 15.7% of the Slovak population declared a language other than 
Slovak as their mother tongue. Hungarian -speakers again constitute the largest 
                                               
7 Report submitted by the Slovak Republic pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Received on 4 May 1999, pp. 6-7.  This and 
reports by other states parties to the Framework Convention, as well as “parallel” reports submitted by 
local NGOs, may be found on the Minority Electronic Resources (MINELRES)  website at: 
http://www.riga.lv/minelres/coe/statereports.htm.  
8 The conservative estimate is from the World Directory on Minorities by Minority Rights Group; 
higher estimates place the Roma population of Slovakia at 480,000-520,000. Although in the 1991 
census Roma were given the opportunity to declare a separate Roma ethnicity for the first time, a 
majority still chose to declare another ethnicity (mostly Slovak or Hungarian) for fear of negative 
consequences. 
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linguistic minority in Slovakia, with over 600,00 persons (11.5 %).9 Although official 
statistics showed Czech-speakers to be the second largest linguistic minority, speakers 
of Romanes actually constitute a group of 245,000-365,000 persons (4.6-6.9%). It is 
estimated that roughly 70% of Roma in Slovakia speak Romanes as their mother 
tongue (European Roma Rights Center 1997: 26 -28).  Finally, although about 50,000 
people declared a dialect of Rusyn to be their mother tongue in 1991, according to 
some estimates, there are about 120,000 people who master the Rusyn language and 
have fully or partially preserved the Rusyn lifestyle and culture.10  This would make 
them the fourth largest linguistic group in the country.  More updated figures are 
certainly needed to ascertain the true size of the Rusyn-speaking group, as well as the 
current size of the Czech-speaking population since the Czechoslovak split.  (There is 
also a growing Russian-speaking minority which is not officially recognised.) 
 
The Hungarian population is settled compactly in an almost continuous 555-
kilometre-long strip along Slovakia’s southern border, in ethnically mixed regions 
together with other minorities and Slovaks (Bakker 1997: 40 -48) (cf. Map 1).  Most of 
Slovakia’s Hungarians live in this predominantly rural area11 where they represent a 
local majority in 435 out of the 551 municipalities which constitute the Hungarian 
habitat (Bakker 1997: 46) (cf. Table 2).  The rest of them live in Slovakia’s two 
largest cities, Bratislava and Košice, where they represent 4.4% and 4.3% of the 
population.  The share of Hungarians is in steady decline (from 12.4 % in 1961 to 
                                               
9 That this number is higher than the number of persons who declared to be ethnic Hungarians is due to 
persons from mixed Slovak-Hungarian families but also to Roma who declared their ethnicity as Roma 
or Slovak but whose mother tongue is Hungarian.  Some Roma may also have declared Hungarian as 
both their ethnicity and mother tongue and would therefore have been included in the figures for the 
Hungarian minority.  The number of Hungarian-speaking Roma registered as Hungarians is estimated 
at 150,000 (U.S. Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Slovak 
Republic, 25 February 2000, at: http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/  
slovakre.html).  In any case, it is absolutely wrong to say that half the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia 
are actually Roma, as Meciar has claimed in order to discredit the demands of the Hungarian minority 
(see “Slovak Prime Minister on Minorities,” OMRI Daily Digest, 31 October 1996; “Meciar says 
Ethnic Hungarians have Enough Rights in Slovakia,” RFE/RL Newsline, 31 July 1998).  
10 Slovak Helsinki Committee, Report on the Implementation of the Framework Convention of the 
Council of Europe on the Protection of Minorit ies in the Slovak Republic, September 1999 (at: 
http://www.riga.lv/minelres/reports/slovakia/NGO/slovakia_NGO.htm).    
11 Only 5.5% of ethnic Hungarians live in cities with a population of over 100,000, compared to 13.7% 
of ethnic Slovaks. 
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10.7 % in 1991), as is the number of municipalities where they constitute a majority.12 
Still, 97% of all Slovak Hungarians live in municipalities where they constitute 20% 
or more of the population.  In ethnical ly mixed districts (where Hungarians make up 
more than 10% of the population), language use is flexible, with most  Hungarians 
and Slovaks living in the Hungarian habitat being bilingual.  According to official 
statistics from 1991 in these ethnically mixed regions, only 3% of Hungarian 
respondents claimed to speak only Hungarian; and more than 60% of  Slovaks in the 
region claimed that they could speak Hungarian (Bakker 1997: 85-86). 
 
The only other minority which is compactly settled are the Rusyns/Ukrainians, in the 
Prešov region in North-eastern Slovakia (cf. Map 2).  
 
2. The Legacy of History (Minority Rights Group 1997) 
 
The minorities living on the territory of Slovakia are indigenous and owe their 
minority status to the redrawing of borders throughout t he centuries.  As new rulers 
have come and gone, some ethnic groups have gained in status and others have lost.  
What is known today as Slovakia was a part of the Greater Moravian Empire and then 
part of the Kingdom of Hungary from the tenth to the early t wentieth century.  During 
the 17th century, the Habsburg Empire gradually extended its control in the region 
and, by the early 18th century, it ruled most of the Hungarian Kingdom.  Slovaks and 
other nations experienced strong pressures to assimilate under the Habsburgs, 
especially after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 which granted Hungary 
direct rule over the region.  Thus, the period from the late 19 th to the early twentieth 
centuries is seen by Slovaks as a period of “Magyarisation”.  With the creation of the 
Czechoslovak State in October 1918 and the Treaties of Trianon (1919) and Saint-
Germain (1920), three million Germans, one million Hungarians, as well as smaller 
groups of Rusyns, Ukrainians and Poles found themselves within the boundaries of 
this new state of Czechs and Slovaks. Hungarians experienced a sudden change in 
status and those who stayed felt like second-class citizens.  Minority rights were 
                                               
12 This is in part due to drastic declines in the aftermath of the two World Wars but also to various 
waves of in-migration of ethnic Slovaks since the last decades of the Habsburg Empire and to a low 
natural rate of increase.  
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guaranteed by the protection clauses of the two treaties, as well as the Constitution of 
the Czechoslovak Republic and a language law.  However, the promised autonomy 
for Ruthenia was never realised.  Although minorities in the inter-war Czechoslovak 
Republic (1918-38) claimed discrimination,13 they enjoyed unique opportunities to 
organise politically, economically and culturally, in comparison to minorities in the 
rest of Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
The most flagrant violations of minority rights occurred during and immediately after 
World War II.  Indeed, as in the rest of Europe, the War and its immediate aftermath 
were marked by genocide, deportations, and mass population displacements. Over  
70,000 Jews were deported under the Nazi puppet-state of Jozef Tiso established in 
March 1939.   In 1938, the southern part of Slovakia was re-incorporated into Admiral 
Horthy’s Hungary, followed by Ruthenia in 1939.  Both regimes were characterised 
by discriminatory practices against minorities in education, language use, and 
government employment, and administration; expulsions also took place (Bakker 
1997: 39).  After the War, the territories of the first Czechoslovak Republic were 
reunited, with the exception of Ruthenia (today part of Ukraine).   
 
Although Roma suffered severe discrimination in Slovakia during World War II, most 
avoided extermination (unlike in the Czech lands) and after the War, many settled in 
the Czech lands.  Through the Beneš Decrees which assigned collective guilt to ethnic 
Hungarians and Germans, and other measures, the post-war Czechoslovak leaders 
attempted to create a nation -state. Ethnic Hungarians on Slovak territory were 
subjected to mass expulsions, forced displacement, and population exchanges with 
Hungary (Bakker 1997: 41);14 German and Hungarian schools were closed and it was 
                                               
13 The Czechoslovak government curtailed the rights of ethnic Hungarians and Germans in several 
ways: by issuing restrictive orders, closing down Hungarian and German schools, denying citizenship,  
and through general discriminatory practices in education, language use and employment (Bakker 
1997: 49). 
14 In 1944-45, the Soviet army deported ca. 50,000 Hungarian civilians to the Soviet Union for forced 
labour; during the summer of 1945, nearly 36,000 Hungarians, among them collaborators of the fascist 
Hungarian regime, were deported to Hungary; about 75, 000 Hungarians were transferred to Hungary as 
part of a population exchange confirmed at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946.  This exchange was 
halted in 1948; between 1946 and 1947, 45-50,000 Hungarians were settled in various parts of 
Czechoslovakia, mainly in areas formerly inhabited by Germans; some 30,000 Hungarians, many of 
them members of fascist organisations, are estimated to have fled abroad after the war to avoid 
persecution. 
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forbidden to use either of the two languages in public.  In 1946, a re-Slovakisation 
policy was launched, including strong incentives (Hungarians who declared 
themselves to be ethnic Slovaks could regain their citizenship and property) (Bakker 
1997: 39), and the use of Hungarian was banned in public life.  After the 1948 
Communist coup, anti-Hungarian policies were gradually halted, but this did not 
signify a return to the pre-war level.  The legal guarantees established during the 
Prague Spring in 1968 were considered outstanding, even by Western standards;15 but 
they were never fully implemented due to the Warsaw Pact invasion and subsequent 
period of “normalisation” which affected minorities like the rest of the population.  In 
1978, there was even an attempt to abolish education in the Hungarian language.16 
Under the communist regime, the Roma, Rusyn, and German minorities had no 
opportunity for education in their mother tongue.  
 
The legacy of history has particularly affected the relations between Slovaks and 
Hungarians and historic grievances continue to play an important role, although this 
might be less true for the average population than for the elites.  It is interesting to 
note that attitudes of Slovaks towards ethnic Hungarians are better in those ethnically 
mixed regions, with ethnic Hungarians tending to view inter-ethnic relations more 
positively than ethnic Slovaks (Bakker 1997: 86-88).17  Mistrust between Slovaks and 
Hungarians is fomented by Slovak and Hungarian politicians making frequent 
reference to various periods of history in which one group was oppressed by the other. 
Furthermore, Slovaks’ sense of national identity has developed in reaction to 
Hungarian and Czech culture.  Slovaks had very little opportunity for developing their 
national identity until the inter-war period.  When the Slovaks and Czechs were united 
in the new Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, many Slovaks felt that Hungarian rule had 
merely been exchanged for rule from Prague.  Thus, the inter-war period was 
characterised by Slovak resentment and the rise of Slovak nationalism.  One of the 
main obstacles building a plural democratic state in Slovakia is the absence of 
democratic symbols shared by all the ethnic groups.  The fact that most of the 
                                               
15 Constitutional Act 144/1968 recognised the Hungarian, German, Polish and Ukrainian minorities as 
state-forming nations that complemented the Czech and Slovak nations. 
16 This led to the formation of the “Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Hungarian 
Minority in Czechoslovakia” whose spokesman, Miklós Duray, was to become one of the main ethnic 
Hungarian political leaders in post-1989 Slovakia (as chairman of Coexistence- Együtéllés).   
17 This is not an uncommon finding. 
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historical figures seen most positively by Slovaks are associated with the Slovak 
national movement, and that, similarly, Hungarians in Slovakia identify with 
important figures in Hungarian history, creates a problem in fostering a sense of 
identity inclusive of other members of other ethnic groups (Wolchik 1997: 202).  
Critics and apologists alike agree that the Slovak puppet state of Jozef Tiso served the 
purpose of Slovaks’ national aspirations for their own independent state; but this can 
hardly serve as an honourable symbol.   
 
3. Minority Concerns and Minority Demands 
 
The Hungarian minority has been particularly effective in pressing its demands and, 
whilst the Slovak government often claims that the situation of the Hungarian 
minority is far better than that of other minorities in Europe, the Hungarian minority 
points to various instances of curtailing of minority rights. When the communist 
regime collapsed in 1989, such complaints came to the surface.  
 
A key factor in relations between the Slovak government and ethnic Hungarians is the 
existence of a kin-state for whom the rights of fellow Hungarians abroad is a main 
element of Hungarian foreign policy (Szilagyi 1996: 45).18  The ethnic Hungarian 
parties have instrumentalised this concern to increase their influence on the 
government, with more or less success depending on whom has held power in 
Hungary (see Section I.4.).  Disputes over minority issues have threatened at times to 
seriously disrupt Slovak-Hungarian relations, with a low-point in the first half of 
1993, during the accession discussions of newly independent Slovakia to the Council 
of Europe, when Hungary even threatened to veto Slovakia’s membership in the 
Council of Europe due to concerns over the situation of the Hungarian minority (see 
Section IV).   
 
With the break-up of the Czechoslovak Federation on 1 January 1993, the Hungarian 
                                               
18 The three pillars of Hungarian foreign policy, as announced in 1996, are: integration into Western 
political and security organisations, establishment or maintenance of good relations with all 
neighbouring states, and protection of the rights of the Hungarian minorities in other countries . In 
1989, Hungary set up an “Office of Hungarians Beyond Borders” to co-ordinate matters concerning 
Hungarian minorities abroad  (see: http://www.htmh.hu/english.htm).  
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minority lost its mediator in Prague and instead turned to the international community.  
This approach of generating criticism of Slovakia’s minority policy has tended to 
backfire as Slovak nationalists blamed it on ethnic Hungarian politicians that Slovakia 
was left out of the initial round of EU candidates.  It has also made most Slovak 
political actors wary of openly co-operating with ethnic Hungarian parties for fear of 
being labelled as “anti-Slovak” and losing votes (see 1994 election campaign).  
Nevertheless, because of its size, and its high level of organisation and political 
representation (see below), and because of the internationalisation of its concerns, the 
Hungarian minority is one of the main domestic actors which the Slovak government 
has had to contend with.  
 
Language-related issues in general, and minority education in particular, have been 
one area of dissatisfaction and friction between the Slovak government and the 
Hungarian minority. 19   Although other minorities share these concerns, there has not 
been the same level of friction with the government for reasons outlined above.  The 
right to education in the minority language has been a particularly sensitive area since 
1994 when the government sought to assert greate r control over Hungarian -language 
schools.  Thus, in May 1995, an “Educational Conception for Regions Inhabited by an 
Ethnically Mixed Population” (also known as “alternative education”) was announced 
with the aim of introducing more courses in Slovak at Hungarian minority schools 
(Bakker 1997: 78-80).  Parents took to the streets when directors of Hungarian 
schools were fired over this plan in Fall 1995, and again in June 1997, when the 
government issued a decree discontinuing the practice of issuing final report cards in 
both Slovak and Hungarian.20 Questions related to the use of the minority language in 
official contacts, the registering of names in the minority language, and also the use of 
topographical signs in the minority language have also been recurrent subjects of 
dispute.  
 
                                               
19 There are many schools at the primary and secondary levels with instruction in Hungarian or in 
Hungarian and Slovak.  However, there are no opportunities for studying in Hungarian at the university 
level.  For more on education rights and minority schools, see Report submitted by the Slovak Republic, 
pp. 24-37, as well as the “parallel report” by the Slovak Helsinki Committee, pp. 4-9. 
20 On 13 January 1999, the Slovak Parliament amended three laws to permit bilingual record-keeping at 
schools with Hungarian or another language of instruction; Bilingual report cards in Slovak/Hungarian 
and Slovak/Ukrainian have thus been ordered by the Ministry of Education (U.S. Department of State, 
1999 Report on Slovakia).  
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Because the level of language rights is strongly linked to the share of the minority 
population in municipalities, the Slovak government has repeatedly sought to 
introduce administrative reforms aiming at diluting the share of ethnic Hungarians in 
municipalities.  In 1993, the government announced plans to reorganise administrative 
districts on a north-south basis to reduce the percentage of ethnic Hungarians to less 
than 20% in all districts.  The Hungarian minority reacted by proposing the creation of 
autonomous administrations (Bakker 1998: 29; Fisher 1995c).21  The government-
proposed administrative reforms, which could be considered as gerrymandering (cf. 
Maps 3 & 4), were ultimately carried out in 1996 (Wolchik 1997: 223; Bakker 1997: 
88-107, esp. 99-100),22 despite a presidential veto and in direct violation of Slovakia’s 
international commitments.  Questions related to territory are particularly sensitive as 
any proposal by the Hungarian minority for re-drawing municipal boundaries or 
increased autonomy is perceived by the Slovak government as a move towards 
secession and a threat to its sovereignty.  
 
The Roma have shown great interest in codification of their language and there have 
been numerous publications in Romanes since the late eighties.  But there is not a 
single kindergarten, grammar school, high school or university where instruction is in 
Romanes, allegedly because the Roma have not asked for it.23 Priorities may lay 
within more serious breaches of their rights due to widespread discrimination in 
employment and education, and extremely poor social and economic conditions 
                                               
21 In January 1994, a group of ethnic Hungarian mayors organised a gathering of about 3,000 ethnic 
Hungarians in the predominantly Hungarian town of Komárno to discuss territorial autonomy in 
reaction to government plans to reorganise the administrative districts.  This resulted in the so-called 
“Komárno Proposal” which generated a lot of negative reactions amongst Slovak politicians and was 
presented by the Slovak media as a ploy to reorganise the administrative division of Southern Slovakia 
so that Slovaks would become a minority.  This was compounded by the fact that the proposed map of 
the “Hungarian region” resembled that of the territories annexed by Hungary in 1938. 
22 Originally approved by the government on 22 March 1996 and again on 3 July 1996, the 
administrative reform recreated eight regions in Slovakia, reducing the number of districts from 83 to 
79.  Two of the main centres of Hungarian settlement, Komárno and Dunajská Streda were split 
between three different regions; other districts with large Hungarian populations were also divided. 
23 There is a secondary art school in Košice for Roma where Romanes is used and a Romany Culture 
Department at Constantine University in Nitra and a separate department in Spišska Nová Ves (see: 
Report submitted by Slovakia, pp. 31-32; see also: European Roma Rights Center 1997: 26-28; Fact 
Sheet on Roma in Slovakia, European Roma Rights Center, September 1999, both at: 
http://errc.org/publications). 
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(Bútora, Bútorová et al. 1998: 63 -75);24 the Roma also do not trust the ability of the 
government to meet their specific needs.  
 
Rusyn language and identity have been undergoing a general revival in Slovakia since 
1989 due to the efforts of organisations such as the Rusyn Renaissance Society 
(Rusyn’ska Obroda).  Their demands include the restoration of Rusyn-language 
teaching, Rusyn-language programmes on state radio and television, etc. (Trier 1999: 
40-41).  The Rusyn language was codified in 1995 in Slovakia and Rusyn-language 
instruction is provided in two schools and there are courses on Rusyn culture and 
language at Prešov University.  
 
4. The Party System and Political Life in Slovakia25 
 
The Slovak party system shares certain features with other post-communist European 
countries: there is a good deal of fluctuation in both political parties and popular 
affiliation with particular parties; many of the umbrella movements and groups that 
united people with a wide variety of political perspectives have fragmented; most 
parties have small memberships; and many citizens in Slovakia have rather low 
opinions of political parties and are not convinced they are essential to democracy 
(Wolchik 1997: 227-232).  However, unlike in the Czech Republic, the fragmentation 
of non-traditional movements has not been followed by the domination of political 
life by parties which can easily be placed on the left-right spectrum, as in more 
established democracies.  Furthermore, ethnic cleavages play a much more significant 
role in the organisation of the party system than does the structure of the state 
(Wolchik 1997: 229).  Finally, political life in Slovakia is dominated by a high level 
of conflict between leaders and, as in other post-communist states, personalities and 
personal rivalries play a key role; Meciar’s dominant role in Slovak politics ever since 
1990 is a clear illustration of this.         
 
                                               
24 For more on the Roma in the region, see the report by the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities released in April 2000, Report on the Situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE Area at: 
http://www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/docs/report_roma_sinti_2000.pdf .  
25 The acronyms are based on the Slovak names of the political parties;  see table 3.4 for the main party 
names in Slovak. 
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Slovak politics have been dominated by the nationalist-populist discourse of two 
parties: the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) of Vladimír Meciar, and 
the radical right-wing Slovak National Party (SNS) (Žitný 1998).26 Although he had 
been critical in 1990 of nationalist demands, since establishing HZDS, Meciar has 
adopted a clear nationalist position and sought the support of the Slovak National 
Party (SNS) (which has been a coalition partner since 1992 as HZDS has always 
failed to win a comfortable majority of the votes).  The commitment of the nationalist-
populist leaders of the HZDS and SNS to democratic principles is not clear, at best.  
They have used all possible means within the limits of legality to defeat their political 
opponents and to curtail any form of opposition.  They have sought to muster support 
for their policies and to further their own political ambitions by instigating anti-
Hungarian sentiments, making racist statements against Roma or suggestions of 
population exchanges between Slovakia and Hungary.27  Their supporters are mostly 
less-educated voters living in rural areas especially pensioners whose modest incomes 
are threatened by market reforms.  Anti-Hungarian campaigning is a part of a larger 
strategy of pointing at “anti-Slovak” elements.  It was especially conspicuous during 
the 1994 election campaign and during the adoption of the 1995 State Language Law; 
but it had already been used by Meciar to discredit those Slovak parties which 
supported preserving the Czechoslovak Federation and the fast pace of economic 
reform advocated by Prague (Wolf 1998: 46-51).  As these strategies have yielded 
results, other Slovak parties have been increasingly reluctant to openly co-operate 
with ethnic Hungarian parties.   
 
Other important Slovak parties include the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), a 
centre-right party led by former dissident Ján Carnogurský, and the post-communist 
Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) which has been accused of selling its votes to the 
highest bidder.  
 
 
                                               
26 The Slovak National Party is a radically nationalist, pan-Slavic and europhobic party, established in 
1990, which openly professes nostalgia for the period of Slovak independence under the Slovak fascist 
leader, Catholic priest Jozef Tiso. Although it has never enjoyed mass support (apart from a score of 
almost 14% in 1990, its share has ranged from 6-9 %), it was a steady member of the governing 
coalition until 1998 and continues to be a vocal and strong presence on the Slovak political scene. 
27 “Slovakia’s Leader Again Plays Nationalist Card,” International Herald Tribune, 13 October 1997.  
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a. Representation of the Hungarian Minority 
Parties representing the Hungarian minority formed immediately after the “Velvet 
Revolution” of 1989, drawing both from the official pre-1989 networks of the 
Hungarian minority as well as from the dissident movements.  The Hungarian 
minority is represented by three main political parties: Együtéllés (Coexistence), the 
Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH), and the Hungarian Civic Party 
(MOS).28 Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia tend to vote for ethnic Hungarian parties 
which are more or less aligned with their ideological counterparts across the border in 
Hungary and are supported by them.29 Originally created to represent not only ethnic 
Hungarians but also other minorities, Coexistence (Chairman: Miklós Duray) is the 
largest (Wolchik 1997: 232).30 The other two are centre -right parties, with MKDH 
(Chairman: Béla Bugár) coming to realise the political benefits to be gained from 
presenting a more moderate position, although its precise stance on autonomy has 
varied over time (Fisher 1995c: 60;  Fisher 1995a).  The liberal party MOS 
(Chairman: Laszlo Nagy) is the oldest and most moderate, and has sought to 
cooperate with Slovak parties.  The three parties have different ideas on the adequate 
protection of Hungarians, and especially on the question of autonomy.  There has 
been infighting between the ethnic Hungarian parties, especially between Coexistence 
and MOS, and their political influence has waxed and waned depending on who has 
been in power in Hungary.31 
 
By the time of the 1992 elections, the level of nationalist sentiment was such that few 
Slovak parties wanted to co-operate with Hungarian parties.  This situation lasted until 
1998. Parliamentary representation in the National Council (Národná Rada) has 
                                               
28 There is also a fourth party, the Hungarian People’s Party, but it has failed to gain significant 
following. 
29 Coexistence’s equivalent in Hungary is the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF); MKDH’s 
counterpart is the Hungarian Christian Democratic Party (MKDP); while the equivalent of MOS is the 
Free Democrats (SZDSZ).  
30 According to a survey conducted in May 1994, Coexistence was the most popular among ethnic 
Hungarian respondents, with 31%, followed by MKDH (28%), SDL (9%) (there is no leftist ethnic 
Hungarian party equivalent to SDL) and MOS (8%). However, opinion polls since 1995 suggest that 
MKDH might now be the biggest of the three parties. 
31 Support from Hungary has been stronger during the period of Hungarian Prime Minister Antall 
(1990-1993) from the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) who placed a high priority on the 
protection of Hungarian minorities abroad; their influence has been weaker under the Horn government 
(1994-1998), as there is no ethnic Hungarian party equivalent in Slovakia to Horn’s Hungarian 
Socialist Party (MSP) in Slovakia and also because good relations with Slovakia have higher priority 
than Hungarians abroad. 
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ranged from 14 to 17 seats (out of 1 50), despite the absence of special measures for 
minority representation.  Coexistence and MKDH have been represented since 1990 
by joining forces in pre-election coalitions.  MOS (then called the "Hungarian Civic 
Initiative"— MOI) ran on the VPN ticket in the 1990 elections, and thus participated 
in Government from 1990 to 1992 and was also represented in Parliament.  It had to 
run alone in 199232 and failed to reach the new 5% minimum threshold. 33 Since 1994, 
it has been represented again as part of the Hungarian Coalition. 
 
b. Other Minority Parties 
Political representation of the Roma is fragmented.  The Romany Civic Initiative 
(ROI), established in 1990, is the oldest, and its membership is estimated at about 
30,000.34 It has never been represented in Parliament because it has failed to reach  
the 5% minimum threshold for a party to accede to the Parliament.  In addition to 
ROI, there are 13 other officially registered Roma parties (Šedivý and Maroši 1995: 
14-15).35 There is also one party representing Rusyns/Ukrainians. 
 
 
                                               
32 MOS failed to reach an agreement with the successor to VPN, the Civic Democratic Union (ODU).  
33 In 1992, a new election law increased the minimum threshold for entering Parliament from 3 to 5%.  
The minimum for a coalition of two parties is 8%.   
34 “Slovak Romany party planning political allegiance with Left parties,” RomNews Network at: 
http://www.romnews.com/a/109-00.html. 
35 For a list, as of May 1999, see: Report submitted by the Slovak Republic, p.18. Another active Roma 
party is the Roma Intelligentsia for Coexistence (RIS). In 1995, efforts at political co-ordination and 
communication led to the creation of an umbrella organisation representing the Roma: the Union of 
Roma Political Parties in the Slovak Republic (URPS SR). Renewed efforts to join forces came in 
September 1999, when 14 out of 15 registered Romany associations and political parties agreed to set 
up a Council of the Coalition of Romany Parties in order to form a single political representation for 
the 2002 elections (see Slovakia.org – The Guide to the Slovak Republic, at: 
http://lisiak.net/slovakia/fa-sep1.htm).   
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III. NATION-BUILDING AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN SLOVAKIA (1990-1998) 
 
1. The Rise of Slovak Nationalism and the Act on the Official Language of the 
Slovak Republic (1990-1992) 
 
In the period immediately following the upheavals of 1989, strong nationalist 
sentiments which had been subdued under the communist regime came to the fore in 
Slovakia.  The first democratic elections in June 1990 (Table 3.1) placed in power in 
the Czech and Slovak Republics the dissident movements which had contributed to 
the fall of the communist regime.  In Slovakia, Public Against Violence (VPN) (the 
Slovak equivalent of Civic Forum— OF— led by Václav Havel) was composed of  
individuals with very different ideas about how to deal with the immediate tasks in the 
transition to democracy.  Because the 1989 “Velvet Revolution” began in Prague and 
because of the high degree of cooperation between Czech and Slovak leaders in the 
period of change, many of the Slovak intellectuals at the forefront were susceptible to 
criticism of not representing Slovak interests sufficiently.  Meciar was a member of 
VPN at the time and thus enjoyed his first term as Prime Minister, from June 1990 
until his resignation in April 1991.  Having regained his position as Prime Minister 
after the 1992 elections, this time under his own party— Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS), Meciar moved fast to assert Slovakia’s national identity against 
Prague.  By the end of the year, Slovakia had declared sovereignty (July 1992) and 
adopted a new Constitution (September 1992). Following the failure of negot iations 
on the Czech and Slovak Federation between Czech Premier Václav Klaus and 
Meciar, the Federal Assembly adopted a law in November 1992 to dissolve the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic. Thus, on 1 January 1993, Slovakia became an 
independent country— for the second time in its history— and the Meciar government 
was faced with the task of strengthening the identity of a state whose population, for 
the most part, had not been in favour of outright independence (Fisher 1996a).  
 
The break-up of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic may partially be attributed to 
the rise in nationalist sentiment in Slovakia, as evidenced by the support for the HZDS 
and the SNS in the 1992 elections;36 but the majority of Slovaks had favoured some 
                                               
36 See Table 3.2 for the results of the 1992 elections to the Slovak National Council. 
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sort of confederation, an option which was not given.37  Furthermore, the break-up 
was essentially a process which took place at the elite level, without consulting the 
Czech and Slovak populations through referendum.38 Another factor was Slovakia’s 
nervousness about the fast pace of economic reform advocated by Prague.  Thus, 
Meciar’s success in the 1992 elections may partly be attributed to his promise to find 
a road to the market that would take Slovakia’s specific features into account 
(Wolchik 1997: 214). 
 
The first sign of tensions over minority issues, and language in particular, appeared in 
1990 during the debate over a bill on the official language in Slovakia.  At the end of 
the summer, the Slovak National Party had launched a campaign for a language law 
aimed at depriving the Hungarian minority of the right to use its mother tongue in 
official matters, as a sort of “historical justice”.  This proposal was supported by the 
Slovak nationalist cultural organisation, Matica Slovenská.  The ethnic Hungarians 
were circulating another proposal which would have allowed for minorities to use 
their language where they constituted at least 10% of the population of a municipality.   
 
The version which was finally adopted on 25 October 1990 (Slovak National Council 
Act No. 428/1990 on the Official Language of the Slovak Republic)39 was supposedly 
a compromise.  It established the Slovak language as the official language “as a means 
of mutual understanding and communication” and in order to “support the 
development of the democracy and the culture of the Slovak nation and of the national 
minorities in the Slovak Republic in the spirit of understanding, of strengthening of 
national tolerance [… ].”40  It did not grant official status to any other language, but it 
allowed for the use of Czech in official contact and for minorities to use their 
language in municipalities where they constituted at least 20%.  But even there, 
                                               
37 Opinion polls held in mid-1992 indicated that: (1) Czechs and Slovaks wanted a referendum to be 
held; and (2) the majority were against the break-up of Czechoslovakia (Wolf 1998: 90-91). 
38 A large share of responsibility was borne by Meciar and Klaus whose personal rivalry and ambitions 
led to the escalation of a process which came to be seen as inevitable and irreversible.  For an insider’s 
view on the split and the political manoeuvrings, see the account written by Slovak journalist Karol 
Wolf (Wolf 1998), based on extensive interviews with Meciar aide Anna Nagyová. 
39 The Act on the Official Language of the Slovak Republic (25 October 1990) may be found in an 
unofficial English translation in: Šedivý and Maroši 1995: 24-25.  
40 Act on the Official Language in the Slovak Republic, 25 October 1990, Section 1 “Introductory 
Provisions”.  
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employees of state administration and local self-government bodies were not required 
to know and use the minority language; and all public documents were to be issued in 
the official language only.  Thus, already in 1990, the Slovak language was granted a 
dominant position.  Although this law was a legitimate step in language policy 
(primarily status planning but also with elements of corpus planing, see section 5 
“Care for the Official Language”) and clarified the official language of Slovakia 
(which until then had been “Czechoslovak”), it could also be used as a means of 
ethnic containment through restriction of the use of minor ity languages on Slovak  
territory at the discretion of state authorities and local officials.   
 
Rather than establish certain standards concerning language use, the Act on the 
Official Language resulted in confusion and inter-ethnic antagonism (Kontra 
1995/1996: 348; see also Kontra 1996), satisfying neither the nationalists (who 
claimed the law went too far in granting minority language rights) nor the Hungarian 
minority (who claimed it did not go far enough).  In October 1991, the Min istry of the 
Interior claimed that the bilingual city signs which had been put up by mayors after 
the collapse of the communist regime were illegal and ordered them to be taken down.  
However, as the text of the law did not explicitly prohibit such signs, ethnic 
Hungarians argued that “what is not prohibited is permitted” (Kontra 1995/1996: 
347).  For years after the 1990 law was adopted, fierce disputes erupted over bilingual 
place name signs, first and last names in the mother tongue, bilingual certificates, etc. 
* * *  
Under the two nationalist-populist coalition governments led by Vladimír Meciar and  
the HZDS (1992-1994, and 1994-1998, with a short interruption from March to 
October 1994), Slovakia was to experience a phase of intense nation-building and 
promotion of the Slovak national identity, accompanied by restrictive policies against 
minorities and any form of opposition.  The State thus extended its control to all 
spheres, including education and culture.  The system of granting subsidies to 
minority organisations for cultural activities and publications was modified, and 
grants to Hungarian organisations especially were greatly reduced (Fisher 1996b). In 
the following section, we shall examine the main initiatives in language legislation 
and policy under the two Meciar governments and see how these fit into the general 
process of Slovak nation-building.  
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2. Building the Slovak Nation-State and the Slovak Constitution (1992-1994) 
 
The Slovak Constitution, adopted on 3 September 1992, was a key step in Slovak 
nation-building, with implications also in the field of language.  It established the pre-
eminence of the Slovak nation, stating that the Slovak Republic is the state of the 
Slovak nation (and not of the Slovak citizens).  Indeed, in its preamble, the 
Constitution states “We, the Slovak People [… ] Together with members of national 
minorities and ethnic groups living in the Slovak Republic.”41  
 
The Constitution confirms Slovak as the official language (art. 6), as already 
established in the 1990 law on the official language, and guarantees minorities the 
“the right to learn the official language” (art. 34.2).  In terms of minority language 
rights, the Constitution guarantees minority citizens the right to receive and 
disseminate information in their mother tongue (art. 34.1), the right to education in the 
minority language (34.2.a) and the right to use the minority language in official 
communications (art. 34.2.b).   
 
The adoption of the Constitution marked the final stage in the move towards 
independence, initiated with the Declaration of Sovereignty on 17 July 1992.  
Although it made great progress in providing basic human rights as well as minority 
rights, it was nevertheless criticised, both by the Hungarian minority (whose 
objections rest mainly with the formulation  “We, the Slovak People… ”) as well by 
scholars who deem that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution can easily be taken 
away, through a simple parliamentary majority, rather than a constitutional 
amendment which requires 60% approval.  Also, the clauses in Part two, Chapter four, 
dealing with minority rights are immediately followed by a clause stating that “the 
exercise of rights by citizens of a national minority guaranteed by this Constitution 
may not threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic or 
                                               
41 In Slovak, the Constitution reads: “My, národ slovenský [… ]”. There is currently a debate whether 
the word národ (which can be translated both as “people” and as “nation”) refers to members of the 
Slovak nation only or whether it could not be interpreted as referring to all citizens of Slovakia. The 
Hungarian minority interprets this as “We, the Slovak Nation” (and I would tend to agree). If the 
drafters had wanted to make an unambiguous reference to all citizens, then a different phrasing could 
have been used, for example: “My, obcania Slovenskej republiky”.  The Slovak Constitution and the 
official English translation may be found on the website of the Slovak Government (at: 
http://www.government.gov.sk/LISTA/sk_frame_vlada.shtml).  
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discriminate against other citizens” (art. 34.3).  This clearly means that there shall be 
no question of territorial autonomy; it also addresses the “fear” that granting minority 
rights might lead to the assimilation of ethnic Slovaks living in mixed regions. 
 
As an illustration of the high degree of sensitivity concerning the Slovak language, 
even on the part of linguists who should be able to provide independent expertise: on 
7 July 1993, in order to fulfil requirements for Council of Europe membership granted 
on 29 June (see Section IV), the 1950 Czechoslovak law on minority names was 
amended.  This led to protests by Slovak nationalists and by the Institute of 
Linguistics of the Slovak Academy of Sciences which argued that the law did not 
conform to the rules of the Slovak language and that Slovak grammar was not within 
the competence of the Council of Europe! (Reisch 1993).  Bowing in to pressure by 
Meciar, President Kovác vetoed the law.42  1993 was further marked by disputes over 
place name signs in Hungarian, leading to the first mass demonstrations of ethnic 
Hungarians in Komárno in August.   
 
3. Language Policy under the Interim Moravcík Government (March-October 
1994) 
 
Some damage control and progress in the field of minority protection (and also 
economic reform) was achieved when Meciar’s rule was briefly interrupted in March 
1994, following defections from the HZDS and a vote of no-confidence.  A broad left-
right coalition, under the leadership of then Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcík, 
governed until the Fall 1994 elections, relying on the tacit support of the ethnic 
Hungarian deputies.  
Under Moravcík, two important laws fulfilling the Council of Europe requirements 
were passed: one on names in birth registers and marriage certificates, and the other 
on the use of bilingual signs (see Section IV).  These acts still failed to satisfy the 
Hungarian minority as common names such as Attila which are not on the approved 
list of names may not be used; and only the religious marriage ceremony may be 
conducted in the minority language, not the civil part.  
                                               
42 This issue was resolved at the end of 1993 with the adoption of Names and Surnames Act No. 
300/1993. 
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4. Consolidating the Slovak Nation-State and the Law on the State Language 
(1994-1998) 
 
The 1994 HZDS and SNS election campaigns were characterised by “anti-Slovak” 
finger-pointing against the other parties and especially the Hungarian parties (Fisher 
1996a).43  The nationalistic and anti-Hungarian campaign yielded results, as the  
HZDS obtained good results but not the majority of votes in the elections held on 30 
September-1 October (Table 3.3).  Unable to convince the SDL to enter the coalition, 
the new coalition government formed by Meciar on 13 December consisted of HZDS, 
SNS and the newly formed Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS), with HZDS taking 
12 out of the new cabinet’s 18 portfolios.  No one was willing to offer the ethnic 
Hungarian parties a position in government, even though they had obtained 10% of 
the votes.  The new nationalist coalition government continued the nation -building 
process and launched an aggressive anti-minority campaign. The government 
programme openly said that the Slovak State would be built on the national principle 
(Fisher 1995c).  One year later, the Law on the State Language was adopted.  
 
The original proposal for such a law was made by the Slovak National Party (SNS) in 
April 1995, in accordance with the policy statement of 12 January 1995 where the 
government had announced its intention to “create the conditions for the thorough 
learning of the state language in the linguistically mixed areas of the Slovak 
Republic.”44 However, the law had much more ambitious aims and this proposal was 
accompanied by a range of measures aimed against minorities and the opposition.45   
 
On 15 November 1995, the Slovak National Council adopted Law No. 270/1995 on 
                                               
43 This was not the first time that such a strategy was used for political ends.  Indeed, the foundation of 
HZDS in 1991 was justified by Meciar in opposition to the supposed anti-Slovak tendencies of VPN 
which supported preserving the federation and the pace of economic reform advocated by Prague (Wolf 
1998: 46-51). In 1992, KDH was again labelled anti-Slovak for not supporting the declaration of 
sovereignty and the new constitution.       
44 Letter of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, sent to Slovak Foreign Minister 
Juraj Schenk on 24 August 1995 (at: http://ww w.osce.org/inst/hcnm/index.html). 
45 For example, in April 1995 the SNS proposed an amendment to the criminal code stipulating 
punishments for anyone engaging in actions seeking to subvert Slovakia’s territorial integrity or to 
reduce its autonomy and expanded the definition of criminal activity to include spreading false news 
endangering the security of the Republic (Fisher 1995a). This amendment was rejected by Parliament 
in February 1997. 
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the State Language of the Slovak Republic. 46 Before voting for the law began, an 
HZDS representative stated that “anyone who votes against the bill is against the 
fulfilment of the Slovaks’ desires and deserves public contempt;” there was even a 
proposal that each deputy state his opinion and cast his vote in front of Slovak 
television (Fisher 1996a).  Almost all opposition deputies thus voted in favour of the 
law for fear of being labelled “anti-Slovak”.  Ethnic Hungarians were alone in voting 
against it, and only the KDH abstained (but more because of church-related concerns).  
It was signed by President Michal Kovác, and entered into force on 1 January 1996, 
thereby cancelling the 1990 Act on the Official Language.  As of 1 January 1997, very 
high fines could be imposed.  The Ministry of Culture was entrusted with monitoring 
compliance and, already in February 1996, “language consultants” began work to 
supervise observance of the law.  
 
The 1995 State Language Law was seen as finally giving the Slovak language the 
position it was due, that of a state language rather than an official language.  It applies 
the “One State - One Language” model, and in the justification section, reference is 
made to (allegedly) comparable policies in other European states and also to the 
United States where an “English Only” or “Official English” movement has aimed at 
making English the official language and which opposes bilingual education in 
elementary and secondary education (Kontra 1995/1996; Taras 1998).47 The 1995 
Language Law also seeks to protect the Slovak language against foreign influences, 
namely “Americanisms”.  
 
The 1995 Language Law was more than a piece of legislation concerning the use of 
language.  It was clearly designed as a pillar of Slovak nation-building, stating that 
“the Slovak language is the most important distinctive feature of the uniqueness of the 
Slovak nation, the most valuable piece of the cultural heritage and expression of 
                                               
46 The text of the law may be found on the web site of the Slovak Ministry of Culture 
(http://www.culture.gov.sk/UVOD/kultura.html), while an unofficial English translation, along with the 
“justification”, may be found in Minority Protection Association 1996. 
47 On the “English Only” movement in the US and how the Slovak language law compares, Kontra 
argues that restrictive legislation for language use seems to be an equally central issue for some 
politicians in “established democracies” such as the USA, as well as in “emerging democracies” such 
as Slovakia.  See also the “Statement on Language Rights” issued by the Linguistic Society of America 
which holds that that speakers should be allowed to express themselves, publicly or privately, in the 
language of their choice. 
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sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and the general means of communication for its 
citizens, which guarantees them freedom and equality in dignity and rights in the 
territory of the Slovak Republic” (Kontra 1995/1996: 351-357). Its overall stated aim 
is to establish the conditions for every citizen to be able to master the Slovak language 
in which he can make himself understood in the entire territory of the state.  At the 
same time, the Law was a means of reasserting the position of the Slovak language 
not only against the Czech language, which had enjoyed a dominant position during 
the period of joint statehood,48 but primarily against the languages of its own 
minorities, especially Hungarian.  In the historical overview of the Slovak language at 
the beginning of the justification section, reference is made to the period of “very 
consistent Magyarisation” under historic Hungary and between 1938 and 1945.   
 
The 1995 State Language Law undoubtedly represented a key step in the process of 
building a Slovak nation-state, without the participation of Slovak citizens belonging 
to ethnic minorities.  Part II of the justification section stated that: “The Slovak 
language is the national language of the Slovaks, who comprise the only state-forming 
element of the Slovak Republic.”  A Slovak political scientist wrote that since 1 
January 1993, “Hungarians and other minorities have become tenants in the country in 
which they have lived together with us because the Slovaks turned it into their own 
nation-state.”49 According to another analysis, “its barely hidden purpose is to remedy 
the ‘historical grievances’ that fell upon the Slovak language, to eliminate the 
linguistic identity of minorities and to use the linguistic superiority of the state-
forming nation as a tool of assimilation” (Minority Protection Association 1996: 6).  
* * *  
By this point, although strong nationalist sentiments persisted, Slovaks were 
beginning to feel alienated.  Disaffection with politics was illustrated by the low 
turnout for the demonstration organised the day the law was adopted: only about 300 
citizens who had been bussed in from all over the country to show their devotion to 
the Slovak language (Fisher 1996a: 14).  In February 1996, the State Language Law 
                                               
48 The state language, according to the 1918 Czechoslovak Constitution, was “Czechoslovak” in two 
versions: Czech and Slovak.  Constitutional Law No. 122 adopted on 29 February 1920, para. 1 
asserted that: “The Czechoslovak language is the state and official language of the Republic.” (See the 
“Justification” attached to the Draft-Law on the State Language submitted to the Slovak Parliament on 
24 October 1995 (Minority Protection Association 1996: 12-17). 
49 Miroslav Kusý, translated by Miklós Kontra (Kontra 1995/1996: 348). 
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was sent by the opposition Christian Democratic Coalition and Hungarian Democratic 
Coalition to the Slovak Constitutional Court in September 1997; it ruled that it 
contravened the Slovak Constitution (see Section IV). 50  Practical repercussions 
domestically were marginal as means of circumventing the Law in many areas were 
found.  At the internat ional level, too, the adoption of the Law led to widespread 
concern and criticism.  But no steps were taken by the Meciar Government to amend 
it nor to adopt a law regulating the use of minority languages, disregarding the 
Constitutional Court ruling as well as domestic and international commitments.  By 
the end of 1997, despite repeated calls by the international community,51 it was clear 
that Slovakia had no intention of doing so.52 
  
During this period, the Slovak government also launched several initiatives aimed at 
making Slovak culture more “Slovak” (to be understood as “pro -government”) (Fisher 
1996b).  The final symbolic act of the Meciar government was the adoption of a law 
on state symbols in 1996, restricting the playing of foreign anthems and display of 
foreign flags.  Again, the Hungarian minority felt particularly targeted by this 
legislation.       
 
 
                                               
50 “Slovak Constitutional Court Rules on Language Law Complaints,” RFE/RL Newsline, 10 
September 1997. 
51 Calls to adopt a law on minority languages were renewed in 1997, inter alia, by Hungary in February, 
by CoE Secretary General Daniel Tarschys and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in April, by 
the OSCE High Commissioner in October (see: RFE/RL Newsline, 4 February 1997; ibid 15 April 
1997; ibid 25 April 1997; ibid 17 October 1997). 
52 This should also be viewed in light of the fact that, in July 1997, Slovakia was excluded from the 
first round of EU candidates (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus) (see 
Section V). 
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IV. THE NEW SLOVAK GOVERNMENT AND THE ADOPTION OF THE 1999 LAW ON 
THE USE OF MINORITY LANGUAGES (OCTOBER 1998 TO PRESENT) 
 
1. The 1998 Parliamentary Elections 
 
In September 1998, parliamentary elections were held in Slovakia (cf. Table 3.4). 
Although  HZDS obtained the most votes (27%), it was defeated by four opposition 
parties which together won a constitutional majority of 93 of the 150 seats in the 
National Council.53  A month later,54 on 30 October, a coalition government was 
finally formed by these four parties, with Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) 
Chairman Mikuláš Dzurinda as Prime Minister.55 The Hungarian Coalition Party 
(SMK) was given three portfolios in the government, including the new position of 
Deputy Premier for Human Rights and Minority Issues.56  By establishing this 
position, held by Pál Csáky, and deciding to include the Hungarian parties in 
government, the three Slovak parties sent strong signals, mainly to the international 
community but also to nationalist forces at home, that the new government was 
determined to break with the previous nationalist-populist one.  Indeed, Dzurinda 
stated that the election results showed that “Slovakia wants a change, a different 
orientation, and an end to constant confrontation.”57 The SMK had made the 
necessary political concessions by issuing a declaration before the elections that it 
“will not push for ethnic autonomy either its political program or in practice.”58  Thus, 
expectations were high concerning Slovakia’s policies towards its minorities and the 
future of democracy in the country.  The international community also sent messages 
                                               
53 The parties in the government coalition are: the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the post -
communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK), and the populist 
Party of Civic Understanding (SOP). The SDK itself is a coalition of five parties: three right-wing 
parties— the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Democratic Party (DS), and the Democratic 
Union (DU)— as well as two left-of-centre parties— the Social Democratic Party (SD), and the Green 
Party (SZS).  SMK, as in the 1994 elections, was formed by the three ethnic Hungarian parties 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 28 September 1998).  
54 Delays were caused by SDL which was originally opposed to the participation of ethnic Hungarians 
in government. 
55 The SDK is a coalition of five parties formed in 1997 with the aim of presenting a united front 
against HZDS. 
56 Composition of the new cabinet: SDK: 9 portfolios, SOP: 2 portfolios , SDL: 6 portfolios, SMK: 3 
portfolios (“Slovak Parties Sign Coalition Agreement,” RFE/RL Newsline, 29 October 1998). 
57 Jolyon Naegele, “Slovakia: Democratic Opposition Has Chance to Change Policies,” RFE/RL 
Features, 28 September 1998. 
58 RFE/RL Newsline,  4 December 1997. 
 29
to Slovakia that it was not too late for EU membership, provided it wa s willing to 
address a few unresolved issues inherited from the Meciar government.    
 
2. Drafting and Adoption of the 1999 Law on the Use of Minority Languages 
 
In its “Programme Declarations” of 19 November 1998, the government announced 
that it would prepare an “Act on the Use of Languages of National Minorities and 
Ethnic Groups.”59 A draft was already expected in February 1999, but agreement was 
delayed by arguments over the contents of the law, namely on scope and percentage.60  
The Hungarian Coalition Party was very strongly in favour of a wide-ranging law, 
regulating not only the use of minority languages in official contacts, but also in 
education, culture, and media, in order to match the fields covered by the 1995 Law 
on the State Language.  Furthermor e, it proposed that the minority language be 
allowed in official contacts in municipalities where the minority constituted at least 
10% of the population; the SMK argued that a 20% minimum threshold, as proposed 
in the government draft, was too high for th e other minorities and would leave out 158 
municipalities representing 100,000 minority members in total. There were also 
concerns that the main motivation of the government was to draft a law as soon as 
possible, before the summer recess in time for a key meeting of the EU,61 in order to 
satisfy EU criteria, with little regard for how the law was to function in practice.62 
Still, the Slovak government parties were optimistic that a law could be passed in time 
without compromising on quality and stated that t he most important consideration was 
                                               
59 See Section IV.3.F “Culture” of the Programme Declarations of the Government (in Slovak and in 
English) of 19 November 1998 on the website of the Slovak Government at: 
http://www.government.gov.sk /LISTA/sk_frame_vlada.shtml. 
60 Ivan Remiaš, “Language law held up by squabble,” The Slovak Spectator, 7-13 June 1999. 
61 The European Commission was due to meet in early July to review Slovakia’s petition requesting 
inclusion in the talks. 
62 “Road to EU paved with good intentions, untried laws,” The Slovak Spectator, 1-7 February 1999. 
According to another article, the Hungarian and Slovak parties had different reasons for wanting such a 
law passed: while the Hungarian Coalition wanted a clear, consistent and wide-ranging bill, the Slovak 
parties didn’t care about the niceties of the law and were mainly preoccupied with winning the approval 
of the EU (“If Hungarians won’t board EU train, leave them at the station,” The Slovak Spectator, 28 
June – 4 July 1999, editorial). 
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to approve a “well-shaped law that people would benefit from.”63 Clearly, the 
government wished to communicate that it was trying to adopt a draft which would 
satisfy all four coalition parties.   
  
On 8 June, the Slovak cabinet finally approved a draft law.  The main principle behind 
it was that the Slovak language should play an integrating role in society.64 This 
version was deemed unacceptable by the Hungarian Coalition Party.  Two weeks 
later, on 23 June, the government approved a revised version, taking into account the 
recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities who had 
travelled to Slovakia upon two occasions.65 Despite the inclusion of these 
recommendations, the revised draft still failed to win the endorsement of the 
Hungarian Coalition Party which decided to submit its own version to the Slovak 
Parliament.66  Thus, strangely, two versions— both emanating from the government—
were presented to Parliament on 28 June.  The Hungarian proposal was defeated on 6 
July, while the proposal submitted by the other three government coalition parties 
remained, along with 20 amendments proposed by the Hungarian Coalition Party.  
The unchanged draft bill was finally rushed through and, on 10 July 1999, law 
184/1999 “On the Use of Minority Languages” was adopted by a narrow majority.  
The opposition (HZDS and SNS) boycotted the vote, while the SMK alone voted 
against it.67  
 
 
 
 
                                               
63 Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Pavol Hamžík, quoted in Ivan Remiaš, “Language law held up by 
squabble,” The Slovak Spectator, 7-13 June 1999. One of the government coalition parties, the SDL, 
was especially critical of the SMK, implying that it was using the time pressure and international 
support to push through “irrational proposals”.  In the eyes of the highly controversial SDL figure 
Robert Fico, the language law issue was a question of dealing with minority languages “in a way that 
allows us to keep our face and a certain measure of independence from not-always objective 
international organisations.” (Ivan Remiaš, “Language law held up by squabble,” The Slovak Spectator, 
7-13 June 1999).   
64 “Minority Language Law passed after emotional seven-day debate,” The Slovak Spectator, 19-25 
July 1999. 
65 “The New Minority Language Law in Slovakia,” Central Europe Review 1:2, 5 July 1999. 
66 Even without the votes of the SMK, the other three parties in the government coalition have 78 out of 
150 seats in the Slovak Parliament which is sufficient to pass a law. 
67 Of the 89 deputies present, 70 voted in favour, 18 were against, and 1 abstained (“Minority Language 
Law passed after emotional seven-day debate,” The Slovak Spectator, 19-25 July 1999). 
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3. Domestic Reactions 
Before the law was even adopted, the opposition organised demonstrations and a 
referendum drive on the use of the state language in official communication.68 But 
President Schuster decided that no such referendum would be held, having been 
informed by experts, including the OSCE High Commissioner, that such a referendum 
would infringe on constitutional provisions prohibiting plebiscites on human rights 
issues.69   
 
According to some analysts in Slovakia, while the government stood to gain minority 
votes by satisfying (ethnic) Hungarian demands, it stood to lose a great deal more 
among the (ethnic) Slovak electorate.  However, given the stability of its electorate, 
the Hungarian Coalition Party only stood to gain by pressing its demands and by 
demonstrating that it wanted to create a firm, uncompromising basis on which it 
would conduct politics.70 But, according to SMK Chairman Béla Bugár, this long-
awaited language law represented a great disappointment and the SMK even 
considered leaving the government coalition because of it.  But the SMK’s official 
statement was quite moderate, stating that it was not entirely satisfied with the law 
because it did not alleviate the negative impact of the existing State Language Law.71 
 
The other three coalition parties clearly considered this law a success and were 
optimistic that the final major hurdle to becoming a possible EU front-runner had 
been removed. Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Pavol Hamžík 
nevertheless stated that he would have been happier had the law been approved by the 
Hungarian Coalition Party.72    
                                               
68 The question read: “Do you agree that the Slovak language should be used exclusively in official 
contacts as it was before June 1, 1999?” In the end 447,000 signatures were collected by HZDS, SNS 
and Matica Slovenská for the referendum which also included a second question on the privatisation of 
strategic companies (381,529 were deemed valid; 350,000 signatures are needed to initiate a 
referendum) (RFE/RL Newsline, 7 July 1999; “HZDS wants referendum on language bill, critics allege 
populist ploy,” The Slovak Spectator, 28 June-4 July 1999;  “Opposition Parties Forewarn Public 
Outrage will Follow President’s Decision,” The Slovak Spectator, 30 August-5 September 1999).   
69 RFE/RL Newsline, 25 August 1999. 
70 Luboš Kubín, political scientist at the Slovak Academy of Sciences (quoted in “Hungarian Language 
Bill Defeated,” The Slovak Spectator, 12-18 July 1999). 
71 “Minority Language Law passed after emotional seven-day debate,” The Slovak Spectator, 19-25 
July 1999. This is quite a complex problem, as it was already not clear how the 1995 Law on the State 
Language affected other laws concerning minority language use in education, media, etc.  
72 “Minority Language Law passed after emotional seven-day debate,” The Slovak Spectator, 19-25 
July 1999. 
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V. THE 1999 LAW ON USE OF MINORITY LANGUAGES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
SLOVAKIA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
The Language Law passed in July 1999 by the Slovak Parliament was regarded as the 
last political criterion which Slovakia had to meet in order to be considered for EU 
membership. To the same extent, it was a delayed fulfilment of one of the 
undertakings of Slovakia under its Council of Europe membership.  
 
This section will focus on the expectations of international organisations in the field 
of language use of national minorities, as a particular form of their overall protection.  
It will also look at the requirements deriving from the Slovak Constitution and the 
1998 government programme.  The enlisting of expectations in this field will help to 
better understand the reactions of international actors as well as the domestic 
dynamics in the field of minority policies.  Further on, we will try to answer whether 
Slovakia fulfilled these expectations by adopting the 1999 Language Law and why the 
reactions to this Law were so different and contradictory.  In order to analyse the 
situation created by this legal act, two additional acts of national legislation will also 
be commented upon: the 1990 Act on the Official Language of the Slovak Republic,73 
and the 1995 Law on the State Language of the Slovak Republic.  
 
1. Expectations and Requirements Concerning a Law on Minority Languages 
 
a.  The European Union 
As already mentioned, the adoption of a language law was regarded as one important 
political criteria Slovakia had to meet in order to be considered for EU membership 
                                               
73 Slovak National Council Act No. 428/1990 on the Official Language of the Slovak Republic. 
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and for accession negotiations to be started.74 As Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan 
stated in an interview: “Slovakia cannot rely on EU understanding if it fails to meet 
this requirement.”75 
 
The first Report on Slovakia prepared by the European Commission in 1997 
expressed serious concerns about the level of democracy and rule of law in the 
country in the context of the political criteria of enlargement agreed upon by the 
Union.  The protection of national minorities in general, and the language rights of 
minorities in particular, were deemed especially important.  Among others, the 
absence of minority legislation was a major source of concern for the European 
Commission.  
 
In the 1998 Regular Report on Slovakia, the Commission concluded, inter alia, that 
“[t]here have been problems in the treatment of minorities and a lack of progress 
concerning the adoption of legislation on minority languages.”76 Therefore, the 
adoption of legislative provisions on minority language use and related implementing 
measures were enshrined in the short-term political priorities of the 1998 Accession 
Partnership on Slovakia, while the medium-term priorities included “the policies and 
                                               
74 The Copenhagen meeting of the European Council in June 1993 made a decisive step towards 
enlargement.  The Member States declared it formally as an explicit goal of the Union. The heads of 
states and governments agreed upon “the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so 
desire shall become members of the Union.  Accession will take place as soon as an associated country 
is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions. 
According to these Copenhagen criteria, membership requires that the candidate country: (1) has 
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for 
and protection of minorities; (2) the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; (3) the ability to take on the 
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union.” In this context associated countries were defined as those countries with which the EU had 
already concluded or planned to conclude “Europe Agreements”. The adopted membership criteria 
became the basis of negotiations and pre-accession strategy with the applicant countries, the last 
condition implying full acceptance of the acquis communautaire, including participation in all three 
pillars established by the Treaty on European Union (for more on enlargement see the EU website at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm; see also “Agenda 2000 - The Challenge of 
Enlargement” at: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60020.htm.  
75 “Language law held up by squabble,” The Slovak Spectator, 7-13  June 1999. 
76 At the same time, the Regular Report referred to the lack of stability in the institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law and protection of human rights, as reflected by the inability to elect a 
President, the controversial use of the transferred presidential powers, the unsatisfactory functioning of 
the parliamentary committees and the disregard for Constitutional Court rulings during the period July 
1997 to end September 1998. 
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institutions protecting the rights of the minorities.”77  
 
The Regular Report of the Commission on the Progress towards Accession on 
Slovakia of 13 October 199978 already took into account the developments that took 
place in Slovakia following the 1998 elections.  The report argued that minority 
protection was one of the areas where the Slovak authorities had made significant 
progress over the previous year.79  According to one Slovak source: “The report 
marked a decisive moment for Slovakia, because for the first time a report produced 
by an international organisation was similar to the Slovak government’s view of itself 
[… ].”80 
 
b.  The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
The expectations on the side of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
were also high.  The High Commissioner, Max van der Stoel, had already suggested 
the adoption of a law on the use of minority languages ever since the 1995 Law on the 
State Language was adopted.  He himself initiated several negotiations in this regard 
with the Meciar government but without much success.  Therefore, in his first letter 
sent to the newly-elected Prime Minister on 4 November 1998, he again stressed the 
importance of adopting a law on minority language use: “it would be desirable to draft 
a law on minority languages as a counterpart to the Law on the Stat e Language.  I am 
aware that several existing laws contain provisions regarding minority languages.  I 
therefore suggest that references to these provisions will be included in such a law.”81 
He even made some recommendations regarding this law and initiated negotiations 
with the coalition parties in order to reach a compromise on the content of the 
provisions. 
 
                                               
77 To the same extent were mentioned “free and fair presidential, national and local elections, effective 
opposition participation in parliamentary oversight committees and supervisory boards.” 
(http//europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/slovakia/rep -10-99/b13.htm). 
78 At: http//europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/slovakia/rep -10-99/b13.htm. 
79 Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession, October 13, 1999 / political 
Criteria / Minority rights and the protection of minorities. See at the above mentioned WebPages. 
80 Martina Pisárová, “EC report crowning achievement of 1999,” The Slovak Spectator, 20-26 
December 1999. 
81 Letter of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, sent to Mikuláš Dzurinda, on 4 
November 1998 (at: http://www.osce.org/ inst/hcnm/index.html). 
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c.  The Council of Europe 
Slovakia also had several “debts” in the field of minority language use to be satisfied 
in the framework of accession to the Council of Europe as the recommendations 
adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly upon approval of Slovakia’s membership had 
not been fulfilled.  
 
Slovakia was invited to become a member of the Council of Europe on 29 June 1993 
by the Committee of Ministers in its Resolution (93)33. This resolution was based on 
Parliamentary Assembly Opinion No. 175(1993) on the application by the Slovak 
Republic for membership of the Council of Europe (Reisch 1993).82  This document 
“asks the Slovak authorities to base their policy regarding the protection of national 
minorities on the principles laid down in Recommendation 1201(1993) on an 
additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European Convention of 
Human Rights” (Paragraph 8).  Paragraph 9 of the Opin ion “takes note of the Slovak 
authorities’ commitment to adopt a legislation granting to every person belonging to a 
minority the right to use his/her surname and first names in his/her mother tongue and, 
in the regions in which substantial numbers of a national minority are settled, the right 
for the persons belonging to this minority to display in their language local names, 
signs, inscriptions and other similar information, in accordance with the principles 
contained in Recommendation 1201(1993).”  On the other hand “it also takes note, 
whatever administrative divisions may be introduced in the Slovak Republic, of the 
declaration made by the Slovak authorities that they will respect the rights of national 
minorities” (Paragraph 11).83  
 
The legislative acts from 1993 on Names and Surnames,84 as well as from 1994 on 
Registers85 and on the Indication of Settlements in the Language of National 
                                               
82 The Council of Europe recommendations were based on the final report by its Rapporteur Tarja 
Halonen, submitted on 13 January 1993.  In this document, she listed the specific requirements that had 
to be met with regard to minoritie s.  On 12 May, the political committee voted to propose Slovakia’s 
admission on the basis of the Halonen report and a ten-point list of the conditions that Slovakia had to 
fulfil.  These also included abolishing the Beneš Decrees from 1945 assigning collective guilt to all 
ethnic Germans and Hungarians on Czechoslovak territory (Fisher 1995c: 59). 
83 Opinion No. 175(1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly, adopted on 29 June 1993 (39th Sitting) (at: 
http://stars.coe.fr/ta/ta93/EOPI175.htm).  
84 Names and Surnames Act No. 300/1993, Section 2(1).  
85 Registers Act No. 154/1994.  Section 16 and Section 19(3) and (5).  
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Minorities86 settled some of the outstanding debts from accession to the Council of 
Europe in 1993.  However, by becoming a member state of the Council of Europe, 
Slovakia has undertaken commitments in the field of general human rights (it has 
ratified the European Convention on Human Rights) and minority protection (it has 
ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities).87  A 
broad range of minority rights are guaranteed in this Framework Convention which 
entered into force in Slovakia in February 1998, including linguistic rights and 
freedoms such as, inter alia, the freedom to receive and impart information in the 
minority language (media) (art. 9); the right to freely use the minority language, in 
private and in public, orally and in writing (art. 10); and the right to use their surname 
and first names in the minority language, to display in the minority language signs, 
inscriptions and other information of a private nature visible to the public (art. 11).  
 
Although Slovakia was among the first to sign and ratify the Framework Convention 
in 1995, in the same year it adopted a contradictory piece of domestic legislation— the 
1995 Law on the State Language.  
 
d.  Bilateral Treaties 
Article 15 of the Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Co-operation between 
the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary establishes a whole range of 
language rights in the field of the overall minority protection envisaged in the 
document.  The basic right to use one’s mother tongue in private and in public is 
complemented with a detailed list of linguistic rights: the free use of names; the use of 
the minority language in administration; the right to disseminate and receive 
information in the minority language, and to have access to public media; education 
                                               
86 Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 191/1994 Coll. on the Indication of 
Settlements in the Language of National Minorities, Section 1. 
87 These and other treaties of the Council of Europe may be found on the website of the Council of 
Europe at: http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/treaties.htm.  
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rights; and the right to profess and practice religion in the minority language.88  Thus, 
the bilateral treaty between Slovakia and Hungary also reflected the expectations of 
international organisations.  To the same extent, it was a clear sign that the effective 
protection of minorities was a major impediment in the development of relations 
between the two states.  According to the Treaty, Slovakia would have had to take 
further legislative measures in order to implement the provisions enshrined in the 
document.  This treaty was signed in Paris in March 1995, in the framework of the 
Pact on Stability for Europe.89  The Pact aimed at improving neighbourly relations by 
avoiding the issue of borders and establishing minority rights on the basis of existing 
international standards, with the prospect of accession to the European Union.  
 
Unfortunately, the treaty could not automatically solve existing disputes between the 
two states; neither did it contribute directly to the improvement of the situation of the 
respective minorities.  On the contrary, article 15 lead to further interpretations and 
                                               
88 Several provisions dealing with minority rights in the bilateral treaties strongly bear the imprint of 
international and regional instruments on minority issues.  One can find in these treaties provisions 
quoted almost word by word from several documents on the rights of national minorities. Similar 
guarantees were enshrined in the Treaty between Hungary and Slovakia (arts. 2 and 15): “in the interest 
of defending the rights of persons belonging to the Slovak minority living in the Hungarian Republic, 
as well as the Hungarian minority living in the Slovak Republic, shall apply as legal obligations the 
rules and political commitments laid down in the following documents [...].” The provisions then list 
the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document, Council of Europe Recommendation 1201(1993) and the 1992 
UN Declaration on Minorities. The bilateral treaties give legal force to these documents through their 
incorporation into the agreements (see: Gál 1999).  
89 The Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation was signed in Paris on 19 March 
1995 (ratified in March 1996), as part of the closing conference of the above mentioned Pact on 
Stability in Europe.  Obviously seeking to send a positive signal to the international community, 
Slovakia was under strong Western pressure to sign the treaty, including a visit to Bratislava, in 
February 1995, by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, and even a letter from US 
President Clinton who stressed the importance of resolving the potential sources of misunderstanding 
and tension in Central Europe.  The desire to be considered a serious candidate for the EU and NATO 
certainly played a very important role, if not a primary role; indeed, it was not a coincidence that the 
Basic Treaty was signed just days before a meeting of the OSCE in Paris during which the Stability 
Pact was signed. 
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misinterpretations by both sides of European norms concerning minority protection. 90 
As an example, both governments have for almost three years not been able to agree 
upon the composition of the joint committees tasked to monitor the implementation of 
the treaty.  Only in November 1998 did the Foreign Ministers of Slovakia and 
Hungary sign a protocol on the implementation mechanism of the bilateral treaty; the 
Joint Commission had its first meeting in January 1999. 
 
e.  The Slovak Constitution 
The Slovak Constitution of September 1992 (see Section II) contains several minority-
relevant provisions (arts. 6, 32, 34).  According to Article 6 of the Constitution, 
Slovak is the official language of the state, while the use of minority languages in 
official communications is subject to further simple legislation.  Article 34 enlists a 
whole set of minority rights and it guarantees “in addition to the right to learn the 
official language, the citizens of national minorities or ethnic groups shall, under 
provisions fixed by law, also be guaranteed: (a) the right to be educated in a minority 
language, (b) the right to use a minority language in official communications [… ]”. 
 
However, apart from the legislative acts in 1993 and 1994, there were no laws 
regulating the use of minority languages in official contacts, as the 1995 Law on State 
Language cancelled the 1990 law in this regard.  There was thus a legal void.91  Even 
                                               
90 In particular the interpretation of the Council of Europe’s Parliament Assembly Recommendation 
1201(1993) provided the basis for further disputes and disagreements in spite of the commitments 
Slovakia undertook in this respect before obtaining Council of Europe membership.  Article 11 of the 
Recommendation has been especially difficult to interpret and unacceptable for Slovakia.90 This article 
includes a reference to special minority arrangements and makes an allusion, according to some 
interpretations, to different types of autonomies as well as collective rights.  Therefore, the Slovak 
government attached an interpretation of this article to the treaty  before its ratification, unilaterally 
amending the agreed text, insisting that “it has agreed to mention the Recommendation of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 1201/1993 exclusively with the inclusion of the 
restricting clause: “ [… ] respecting individual human and civil rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities.”  According to this interpretation, it is obvious that the Slovak 
government was afraid to incorporate any reference to collective rights or to the special status of 
national minorities in a bilateral agreement.  
91 The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities referred to this in his correspondence with 
then Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk.  According to a letter dated 26 February 1996 by the High 
Commissioner, “the Law on State Language states [… ] that the usage of languages of national 
minorities and ethnic groups will be dealt with in separate legislation.  On the other hand, however, 
article 12 of the Law states that Law 428/1990 on the Official Language of the Slovak Republic is null 
and void [… ] However, the right to use a minority language in official communications has been laid 
down in article 34 of the Slovak Constitution ‘under provisions fixed by law’. As long as new 
legislation on this subject is not yet in force, there is, therefore, a legal vacuum” 
(http://www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/index.html).  
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the Slovak Constitutional Court ruled on 9 September 1997 that art. 3(5) of the 1995 
Language Law, stating that written communication s intended for public-legal 
administration matters must be in the State language, was contrary to the Slovak 
Constitution.92  Despite this ruling by the Slovak Constitutional Court and repeated 
international criticism, no steps were taken under the Meciar government either to 
amend the State Language Law or to adopt a law regulating the use of minority 
languages.  Indeed, some government representatives even claimed that existing 
legislation gave sufficient protection to minority languages and that they would rather 
favour acceding to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. 93 
Nevertheless, Slovakia has not yet signed this Charter,94 which offers a wide range of 
measures concerning all aspects of minority language protection and promotion. 
 
f.  The Programme of the Dzurinda Coalition Government 
The new government programme addressed international expectations to a large 
extent.  Under Chapter IV.1 (Democratic Legal State) of its Programme Declarations, 
adopted on 19 November 1998, the Slovak Government states that it will “undertake 
an analysis of the state of human and minority rights in the Slovak Republic with 
regard to international documents, and on the basis of its results it will decide on 
entering further international conventions, on the adop tion of a Constitutional law or a 
law on the position of minorities of the Slovak Republic.”95 Section IV.3.F (Culture) 
mentioned, among others, the adoption of a law on use of minority languages. 96 The 
Prime Minister stressed in a letter to the High Commissioner on National Minorities 
that: “We regard the rapid solution of the open questions concerning national 
minorities in our country as our contribution to build an inclusive type of society and 
thus extend the zone of peace and stability in Central Europe, which is an important 
                                               
92 However, the Court did not uphold ten other complaints against the law, saying that a number of 
mistakes were made in filing them  (“Slovak Constitutional Court Rules on Language Law 
Complaints,” RFE/RL Newsline, 10 September 1997). 
93 “Slovak Government won’t Pass New Language Law,” RFE/RL Newsline, 5 November 1997. 
94 According to the latest update (28 March 2000) on signatures and ratifications of the Charter 
(http://www.coe.fr/tablconv/148t.htm). The text of the  European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (5 November 1992) may be found at: http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/148e.htm.  
95 Programme Declarations of the Government (in Slovak and in English) of 19 November 1998 on the 
website of the Slovak Government at: http://www.government.gov.sk/LISTA/sk_frame_vlada.shtml.  
96 Program Thesis from 27 October 1998 of the SDK-SDL-SMK-SOP coalition, in Hungarian 
translation in: József Reiter, A szlovákiai Magyar Koalíció Pártja kormányzati tevékenységének elsö 
négy hónapja (The first four months of the Hungarian Coalition in government), at: http:// 
hhrf.org/magyarkisebbseg/9901/m990117.htm.  
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element of the European integration process in this part of our continent.”97  
 
2. International Reactions to the Adoption of the 1999 Minority Language Law 
 
The Law on the use of minority languages (entered into force on 1 September 19 99) 
can be considered as a direct outcome of the government programme and aiming at 
fulfilling the commitments that Slovakia undertook since the new Slovak state was 
established. 
 
The adoption of the 1999 Language Law was interpreted very positively by 
international organisations. Based on the 1999 Regular Report, the European 
Commission started accession negotiations with Slovakia in February 2000, after the 
favourable decision taken by the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999.  
That was the clearest sign that the European Commission was in favour of the adopted 
language law98. 
 
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel called the 
language law a considerable step forward.99  In a press release on 19 July 1999 he 
stated that “[b]y adopting Article 2 of the new Law concerning the use of minority 
languages in official communications, not only has the Slovak Republic restored an 
established practice which was eliminated under the previous Government, but it 
brings Slovakia’s law in this matter back into conformity with the Slovak 
Constitution, applicable international standards and specific recommendations from 
relevant international institutions, including my own office. With regard to application 
of the Law as a whole, I have received the assurance of the Government that the 
provisions of the Law on the Use of Minority Languages will prevail, as a matter of 
subsequent and specific law, when interpreting and applying the Law in relation to 
provisions of the Law on the State Langu age.  I consider solution of the question of 
the use of minority languages in official communications to be a step forward which 
                                               
97 The quote by the Prime Minister is from a letter dated 12 November 1998 to the OSCE High 
Commissioner (at http://www.osce.org/ inst/hcnm/recomm/slovak/1998/11gal98.html). 
98 In March 2000, the European Commission announced that it was ready to open negotiations with 
Slovakia on eight out of the 31 chapters of the acquis communautaire; talks are to begin in May. 
99 “Van der Stoel likes Slovakia’s Minority Language Law,” The Slovak Spectator, 13-19 September  
1999. 
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follows previous decisions of the Government in the field of inter-ethnic relations 
[… ].”100 
 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe terminated the monitoring of 
the fulfilment undertaken by Slovakia soon after the law was adopted, putting an end 
to six years of monitoring since Slovakia’s acceptance.101 This decision was based 
also on the fact that “a law was adopted on 10 July 1999 to regulate, in conjunction 
with other specific laws, the use of minority languages in official communications.” 
The document emphasised “the law, which restores previous practice— interrupted by 
the adoption of a law on the state language— and satisfies a constitutional 
requirement, was adopted following consultations with the OSCE High Commissioner 
for National Minorities, the European Union and the Council of Europe and is 
welcomed.”  
 
Having stressed the expectations on the international level regarding the adoption of a 
law on minority language use and the diverging reactions after the adoption of this 
law (see domestic reactions in Section III), the immediate question would be: why 
these discrepancies in the interpretation of the law?  Why were the reactions so 
different and contradictory?  In order to understand the different attitudes towards the 
1999 language law, it must be analysed from two points of view: (1) what does this 
legal text say? and (2) what does this law mean in practice?  
 
                                               
100 “High Commissioner Welcomes Restoration of Use of Minority Languages in Official 
Communications in Slovakia,” OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Press Release, 19 
July 1999 (at: http://www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/index.html).  
101 Recommendation 1419 (1999) Honouring of obligations and commitments by Slovakia (Extract 
from the Official Gazette of the Council of Europe, September 1999), “e. regarding minorities: the post 
of a deputy prime minister responsible for human rights, minorities and regional development, and a 
parliamentary committee for human rights and minorities have been created; bilingual certificates are 
used in schools with instruction in a minority language; a law was adopted on 10 July 1999 to regulate, 
in conjunction with other specific laws, the use of minority languages in official communications: the 
law, which restores previous practice – interrupted by the adoption of a law on the state language – and 
satisfies a constitutional requirement, was adopted following consultations with the OSCE High 
Commissioner for National Minorities, the European Union and the Council of Europe and is 
welcomed; other problems, however, resulting from the state language law, with regard to freedom of 
expression, as well as the use of minority languages in other settings, notably education, still need to be 
regulated, in conformity with recommendations by the three international organisations; the ratification 
of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is also strongly recommended 
(Recommendation 1419 (1999) “Honouring of obligations and commitments by Slovakia,” at: 
http://stars.coe.fr/ta/ta99/erec1419. htm). 
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3. Analysis of the 1999 Language Law102 
 
a.  What does the law say? 
There are three problematic issues in the 1999 Law: 
(i) The Law regulates the language use of national minorities living in Slovakia only 
in their official contacts with local self-governments: “The purpose of this Act is to 
lay down, in conjunction with specific legal acts, the rules governing the use of 
minority languages also in official communication” (art. 1). 
 
Although the concept of official contacts has not been defined in this case, from its 
wording it becomes clear that it regulates minority language use in contacts with the 
local administration.  It guarantees the right:  
· to submit written requests to the local and state administration and to get an 
answer next to the state language, also in the minority language (art. 2.3) with the 
“exception of public documents”;  
· to distribute official forms of the local administrative bodies in a minority 
language upon request (art. 2.6); as well as to provide on request information 
about general legal regulations in a minority language (art. 4.3); 
· to conduct meetings of the local administrative bodies in a minority language, if 
all present at the meeting agree (art. 3.1); and the use of a minority language by 
representatives of local administration at meetings with the assistance of an 
interpreter provided by the municipality (art. 3.2); 
· to keep records/chronicles of the municipality also in a minority language (art. 
3.3) 
· to display important information (warnings, protection and health notices) in 
public areas also in a minority language (art. 4.2). 
 
The law provides the possibility to mark streets and to display other local 
geographical signs in a minority language (art. 4.1). It also enables local 
administrative bodies and their employees to use a minority language in official 
                                               
102 The analysis of the 1999 Language Law is based on a translation into English provided by the 
Council of Europe; for the Slovak original, “Zákon o používaní jazykov národnostných menšín,” see 
the website of the Ministry of Culture, at: http://www.culture.g ov.sk. 
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contacts (art. 7.1); however, it leaves the decision up to the municipality or local 
administration: “municipalities may display” (art. 4.1), “may use also a minority 
language” (art. 7.1).  
 
It declares that local administration bodies are obliged to create conditions for the use 
of minority languages (art. 7.2), but at the same time it declares that these bodies are 
obliged to use the state language in official communication (art. 7.1). 
 
Article 5 clearly establishes that the use of minority languages in court proceedings, 
education (enlisting pre-school, primary and secondary education) and culture are 
regulated by separate laws.  At the same time, it regulates in its article 2.4 that 
decisions made in administrative proceedings are issued in both the minority and the 
state language upon request, although the state language version takes precedence in 
case of doubts. 
 
(ii) In addition to its most important feature of regulating minority language use in 
official contacts only, there is a main condition which has to be fulfilled: minority 
language use in official contacts is restricted to those municipalities where “persons 
belonging to a national minority constitute according to the last census at least 20% of 
the inhabitants of a municipality” (art. 2.1).  As provided by the law, the government 
regulates in a decree those municipalities that meet this condition (art. 2.2).  
 
The 20% threshold is not a new requirement in the history of Slovak law.  This 
minimum percentage was already established for the use of minority languages by the 
1990 Law No. 428/1990 on the Official Language of the Slovak Republic.  This law 
adopted still under the Czechoslovak Federation regulated the use of minority 
languages in communication with the authorit ies, while stating that the official 
language was Slovak. (art. 2).  Thus, all official documents were to be issued in 
Slovak (art. 6).  The use of minority languages was allowed in dealings with 
authorities in those areas were persons belonging to a minority community constituted 
at least 20% of the local population.  
 
(iii) Although the 1999 Language Law could be regarded as generous in providing the 
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above-listed rights for persons belonging to national minorities in those municipalities 
which fit the requirements, the provisions by themselves are all quite restrictive. 
While establishing certain rights, it immediately restricts these rights by creating 
exceptions that are not defined in a proper way.  It thereby gives the possibility of 
interpreting them in a contradictory manner even (art. 2.3 “except in the case of public 
documents”).  The best example of the contradiction in the text itself is between the 
two paragraphs of art. 7.  Paragraph two of this article states that local administrative 
bodies are obliged to create conditions for the use of minority languages according to 
the terms of this law and separate regulations.  At the same time, paragraph one 
declares that the local administrative bodies and their employees are obliged to use in 
official contacts the state language and may use a minority language if this complies 
with the terms set by law.  Immediately restricting this generous declaration by adding 
that these administrative bodies and  “shall not be required to have the command of a 
Minority Language.”  
 
b.  What does the law mean? 
Having analysed the text of the 1999 Law, it is very important to look at the meaning 
and implementation of these provisions.  A legislative act only makes sense if it 
regulates an existing issue/relation and if it can be used and implemented in practice. 
 
(i) Being formulated in a vague and contradictory way, and because of escape clauses, 
this is a legislative act full of loopholes.  To the same extent, it leads to doubts as to 
the intention of the legislators as enshrined in the preamble of the law which says that 
the law was enacted “pursuant to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and 
international instruments binding on the Slovak Republic” and is “recognising and 
appreciating the importance of mother tongues  of the citizens of the Slovak Republic 
who are persons belonging to national minority as an expression of the cultural wealth 
of the state.” At the same time, it is “realising that the Slovak language is the State 
Language.”  This makes it very difficult to ascertain the real intentions of the 
legislators concerning each article and the law in its totality. 
 
The first deficiency is that it defines neither the term “official contacts” in general 
(art. 2.1), nor that of  “public documents” in particular (art . 2.3).  The rights enshrined 
 45
in the provisions are either formulated inconsistently or are vaguely formulated in 
order to avoid effective implementation.  As in the case of streets and other 
geographical signs, the use of the minority language depends on the goodwill of the 
given municipality (these may use the minority language).  This can be regarded as a 
restrictive interpretation of the provisions enshrined in paragraph 15.2/g of the 
Slovak-Hungarian Bilateral Treaty103 as well as in article 7 paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1201(1993).104 
 
Furthermore, the contradictions in article 7 will create confusion.  It is not easy to 
imagine how this provision will ever be implemented nor how the implementation of 
this provision will ever be claimed before court proceedings.  What will this look like 
in practice? A citizen speaking a minority language in a municipality that is in 
conformity with the law (minority population above 20%) has the right to address a 
question to the employee of the local administration in his/her mother tongue (art. 
7.2).  On the other hand, nobody has to understand his request (as the local 
administration will not be required to hire a minority language speaking employee, 
art. 7.1).  Even if, by mere coincidence, the employee does understand it, he/she is 
obliged to answer in the state language (art. 7.1).  However, he/she may (under 
undefined circumstances: i.e., he/she is having a good day, the boss is not present, or 
there is no Slovak in the room) answer in the minority language. 
The law provides at the same time certain rights that will not work automatically 
between the person belonging to the minority and the local administrative bodies.  
This is the case where the rights are exercised only upon request (arts. 2.4; 2.6 and 
4.3), presuming that the person belonging to the minority is aware of his/her right to 
address a request, speak, etc., in the minority language.  
                                               
103 Article 15.2/g says:  [… ] “They shall also have the right, in conformity with the domestic law and 
with the international commitments undertaken by the two Contracting Parties, to use their mother 
tongue in contacts with official authorities, including public administration, and in judicial proceedings, 
to display in their mother tongue the names of municipalities in which they live, street names and 
names of other public areas, topographical indications, inscriptions and information in public areas.” 
104 Article 7.3: “In the regions in which substantial numbers of a national minority are settled, the 
persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to use their mother tongue in their contacts 
with the administrative authorities and in proceedings before the courts and legal authorities. Article 
7.4: “In the regions in which substantial numbers of a national minority are settled, the persons 
belonging to that minority shall have the right to display in their language local names, signs, 
inscriptions and other similar information visible to the public [… ].” 
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The intention of the legislators is even more confusing when looking at the basic 
conditions established by the law.  There is the requirement of minimum 20% of 
minority members in a municipality in order for the law to take effect.  But, in 
addition, this provision is further restricted by a government decree that gives a list of 
municipalities satisfying these conditions. (As one of the analyses prepared by the 
Hungarian Human Rights Foundation states: the government listing Decree no. 
221/1999 strangely failed to include several minority-inhabited communities.105)  
 
(ii) The 1999 Language Law has to be placed and defined in the context of Slovak 
national legislation.  It is a simple legislative act and, as such, does not take 
precedence over other laws.  The last paragraph of the law cancels article 10 of the 
Law on the State Language of the Slovak Republic, although article 10 merely refers 
to the fines that can be levied— and not to the official use of the state language (art. 
3106).  As there are no other acts which would have cancelled the 1995 Law, and as 
this 1999 Law does not contain any provision on its position within the Slovak 
legislation, it is very unclear which act will take precedence: whether any of them 
could be regarded as lex specialis over lex generalis.  
 
(iii) According to some interpretations, as the last article of the Law cancels only 
                                               
105 One of the reasons for the omission was that the list, originally excerpted from Law 191/1994 on the 
Designation of Localities in National Minority Languages, did not include municipalities which 
received their Slovak-language equivalents after 1945. In addition, since 1994, several primarily 
Hungarian-inhabited suburbs have decided to separate and create their own administrative units. These 
changes are also not reflected in the government’s list, resulting in the omission of one Czech-inhabited 
and 66 Roma inhabited municipalities.” See HHRF Hungarian Minorities Monitor 1:1, July-August 
1999. 
106 Article 3 of the 1995 Law on Sate Language states among others that: (1) State agencies and 
entities, organs of the territorial self-governments and public institutions [… ] are obliged to use the 
state language in exercising their competencies on the entire territory of the Slovak Republic. Proof of 
proficiency in speaking and writing the state language is a condition to employment or engagement in 
other work-like situations, and is a prerequisite to completing specified contractual work for public 
bodies [… ] (3) In the state language [… ] hold all deliberations of public bodies; are recorded all 
official documents [… ]; are indicated the official names of communities and their parts, the names of 
streets and other public places, other geographic terms, as well as data contained instate maps, 
including cadaster maps; a separate law will regulate the designation of localities in other languages; 
[… ] (4) All public authorities, and all organisations established by them, are obliged to use the state 
language in every informational system and inter-agency contact. (5) Citizens prepare all written 
submissions to public bodies in state language.” (Quotations from the Slovak State Language Law in: 
Minority Protection Association 1996). 
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article 10 of the 1995 State Language  Law, the often and highly contested Law on the 
State Language of the Slovak Republic remains in force.  The general principle of the 
1995 law was to position the Slovak language as the exclusive language to be used in 
almost every aspect of life.  Thus, the fields addressed included: use of the State 
language in official contact (art. 3); in education (art. 4); in mass media, cultural 
events and assembly (art. 5); in the armed forces, armed services and fire departments 
(art. 6); in court and public administration proceedings (art. 7); and in the economic 
sector, service industries and health care (art. 8).  Although the 1995 State Language 
Law referred to the protection, promotion and use of the Slovak language, it restricted  
at the same time to a large extent the use and overall status of the minority languages 
since there was a lack of regulation regarding minority language use.  It could also be 
used to discriminate against minority members employed in the civil services, and 
against teachers at Hungarian minority schools.  The 1995 law was thus considered as 
a major setback even in comparison with the 1990 legislation. 
 
Article 3 of the 1995 Law describes official contacts in a broader sense, referring to 
all public bodies, such as state agencies, self-governments, public institutions, 
transportation and telecommunication, armed forces, armed security services, fire 
departments.  These public bodies are not enlisted in the 1999 Law.  The uncertainty 
created by the 1999 Language law could easily lead to the interpretation that if the 
1999 Law is not clear enough or does not regulate in a detailed way the language use 
of minorities in official contacts, then article 3 of the 1995 Law on Sate Language will 
prevail except for article 10 (no taxes will be levied for violating the 1995 State 
Language Law).  The assurances of the Government that the provisions of the Law on 
the Use of Minority Languages will prevail, as a matter of subsequent and specific 
law, when interpreting and applying the Law in relation to provisions of the Law on 
the State Language, are not enough in this sense. 107 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
107 See the above quoted letter of Prime Minister Dzurinda to the OSCE High Commissioner.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
1. Impact of the Minority Language Law on Inter-Ethnic Relations in Slovakia 
 
One of the first conclusions derived from the pure analysis of the law refers to the fact 
that the text mostly follows international requirements.  It does not contradict the 
major legal international, bilateral and national documents, such as the Council of 
Europe Framework Convention, Council of Europe Recommendation 1201, the OSCE 
Copenhagen Document, the Slovak-Hungarian Bilateral Treaty or the Constitution, 
from a strictly legal point of view.  The problem lies in the meaning and 
implementation of the law: the wording of the text, the loopholes that were built into 
the different paragraphs and the legal uncertainty it creates. Therefore, it can be stated 
that the law was hardly formulated and adopted with the intention of using it in 
everyday practice. (This would be almost impossible given the contradiction in article 
7).  In order to implement the 1999 Language Law, other laws or decrees are needed 
that clarify the provisions, fill in the legal gaps and give concrete meaning to the 
terms used. 
 
The mere existence of a law on the use of minority languages is positive in itself. It 
also represents progress compared to the situation after the adoption of the 1995 Law 
on the State Language, and even to the period 1990 -1995 when the 1990 Law on the 
Official Language was in force.  However, it is a vague and hard to interpret legal 
text.  Although it does not contradict Slovakia’s international undertakings, the spirit 
of the law is questionable from several aspects.  Therefore, one can conclude that it 
has helped the legitimisation of the new Slovak government and is a milestone in the 
process of Slovak accession to the European Union.  But most probably, it will not be 
used by the national minorities in their official contacts with local authorities.  One 
important point of the  government programme has been satisfied with the adoption of 
this law, but the minorities themselves remained unsatisfied yet again.  
 
Internally, the 1999 language law is a failure as it has revealed disagreements within 
the government coalition parties and has satisfied neither the Slovak nationalists—
who consider the law too far-reaching— nor the ethnic Hungarians— whose proposals 
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were not taken into account.  This is indeed the most striking feature of the adoption 
process: that a law concerning minorities was adopted without the support of the 
minority concerned, even though it was represented in government.  But this law was 
arguably the best which could have been achieved, given the particular political 
context, as there are lingering fears among Slovak parties that it is politically 
dangerous to be seen as too conciliatory to the Hungarian minority.  As one analyst 
wrote, “giving the Hungarians just about enough to keep them content is the safest 
way to avoid strong reactions from Meciar’s followers and other nationalists.”108  
Some have argued that a stronger version of the law, as proposed by the Hungarian 
Coalition Party, would have threatened to seriously disrupt inter-ethnic relations. 
Hopefully, the force of these nationalist political stratagems will decrease as 
Slovakia’s experience with democracy and free media grows; this process can also be 
abetted by the Hungarian minority itself.109      
 
Before speculating about the possible effects of the law on the minority communities, 
one must first ask whether there will be any impact at all, as there has traditionally 
been a large discrepancy in Slovakia between what is written in the law and the actual 
situation (“posturing”).  Indeed, legal provisions can be curtailed by government 
decrees or circumvented by local decrees issued by mayors of predominantly 
Hungarian municipalities.  According to the Hungarian parties, the law will result in a 
situation where Hungarians and Rusyns will continue to break the 1995 State 
Language Law by using their mother tongue.  Indeed, the 20% threshold can exclude 
the Rusyn population from the benefit of language rights.110  As Roma in Slovakia 
have not yet codified or standardised their language, it is hard to imagine that they 
will be able to claim application of the rights contained in the 1999 law.  But there are 
increasing signs that they wish to do just that.  Indeed, on 9 March, Romani Civic 
Initiative (ROI) announced that it was demanding that the 1999 law be applied in the 
                                               
108 Paul Nemes, “Reversing Xenophobia. Assessing one year of power-sharing at the MKP party 
conference,” Central Europe Review 1:23, 29 November 1999. 
109 One of the stated goals of Pál Csáky has been to neutralise the effect of the so-called “Hungarian 
Card (Ivan Remiaš, Guest Interview with Pál Csáky, “I bring more empathy to Romany Problems,” 
Slovak Spectator, 16-22 November 1999). 
110 “Ruthenian Language Rights takes one Big Step Forward, a Half Step Back in Slovakia, while 
Slovakia takes a Big Step Forward,” Rusyn News and Information Service (www.legacyrus.com/ 
NewsReel/RusynNews). 
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57 municipalities where Roma make up more than 20% of the population.111  
 
Many issues still remain to be dealt with: practical realisation of the provisions in the 
1999 law, regulation of the use of minority languages in other spheres (especially in 
culture, education and media), Hungarian higher education, and the restoration of pre -
1996 administrative districts.  The following questions then arise: (1) is the new 
Slovak government prepared to fully protect and promote minority language rights or 
will language-related demands continue to be highly sensitive? and (2) to what extent 
is the new government ready to accept members of ethnic minorities as equal 
constituent elements of the Slovak state?   
 
Improving the situation of Hungarian and other minorities, especially in the field of 
education in the mother tongue and teacher training, has been a stated priority of the 
new government.112 In its Programme Declarations, the government also stated that it 
would “ensure the protection and development of the state language,”113 while the 
only mention of minority of minority languages in the whole document is in the 
announcement of a minority language law.  It cannot really be said that the new 
government is committed to the principle of linguistic diversity (see preamble) as the 
state language still enjoys a dominant position in all spheres of life.  There are also 
discussions about a minority law to be adopted by the end of 2000, as announced in 
the government’s programme.  But the real test of the Slovak government’s 
commitment to multicultural ideals and ethnic diversity will be its ability to address 
the case of the Roma— and it is under intense international pressure to do so.  There 
have already been several statements by government members which indicate a move 
away from the Slovak nation-state concept to that of a true multiethnic society, where 
all Slovak citizens will be equal members of society.  In his New Year speech, 
                                               
111 Statement by ROI Chairman Gejza Adam (“Slovak Roma Want Language Law Implemented,” 
RNN, 9 March 2000).  ROI has stated that this would imply creating 20,000 new jobs in local 
government and civil service for members of the Roma minority.  As desirable as this would be, this 
does not flow from the 1999 law as it does not require that local officials speak (nor even understand) 
the minority language. 
112 On 5 November 1999, Csáky announced plans to establish a Hungarian-language teacher-training 
university faculty (Új Szó, 6 November 1999, in Hungarian Human Rights Monitor). He has also been 
entrusted with developing similar plans for the Ukrainian, Rusyn and Roma minorities at Prešov and 
Nitra universities. 
113 Section IV.3.F “Culture”. 
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President Schuster announced that 2000 is to be the year of “national reconciliation” 
between Slovaks and ethnic minorities;114 and on 5 January 2000, Csáky announced 
that the government had accepted a multiethnic model for Slovak society, meaning 
respect for all minority communities, and not only the Hungarian minority.115  
 
2. Slovakia’s “Return to Europe”? 
 
A clear positive factor will be Slovakia’s “return to Europe”.  There has been a 
marked improvement in Slovakia’s international standing116 and chances of EU (and 
NATO) membership.  Slovakia’s relations with Hungary have also improved, despite 
the latter’s strong disapproval of the language law.117 The EU’s decision to invite 
Slovakia to begin membership negotiations was described by Prime Minister 
Dzurinda as “the greatest achievement in the history of Slovakia.”118 But EU officials 
have made it clear that there will be no softening of requirements for the second wave 
candidate countries.119  The international community has made it especially clear that 
Slovakia’s return to Europe is conditional upon active efforts to improve the situation 
of minorities and especially that of the Roma.  Thus, merely stating its good will and 
introducing a few legislative measures will not suffice.  
 
It remains to be seen how Slovakia’s integration into European structures and 
implementation of minority policies will be hampered by political instability, dissent 
within the coalition parties,120 and government scandals.121 Particularly disquieting are 
the signs of lingering personal rivalries, especially within the Slovak Democratic 
                                               
114 “Slovak President Says Difficulties Still Ahead in 2000,” RFE/RL Newsline, 3 January 2000. 
115 Radio Slovakia International, 5 January 2000 (see Hungarian Human Rights Monitor). 
116 There have been visits or encouraging remarks by Robin Cook, Madeleine Albright and Council of 
Europe Deputy Secretary General Hans Christian Krüger, inter alia.  
117 “Hungary Praises Slovakia’s Improved Minorities’ Policies,” RFE/RL Newsline, 1 October 1999. 
Also, meetings have been held between the Slovak and Hungarian Foreign Ministers (December 1999) 
and between the two Prime Ministers (March 2000).  
118 “Slovak Politicians Welcome EU Summit Decision,” RFE/RL Newsline, 13 December 1999. 
119 These are, in addition to Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania. Latvia and Lithuania (Breffni O’Rourke, 
“EU: Enlargement Negotiations Adhere to Tough Criteria,” RFE/RL Features, 15 March 2000). 
120 In one such incident, SDL refused to appoint an SMK member as head of the Slovak Land Fund, 
despite an alleged verbal agreement, because it suspected SMK of wanting to use that position to 
restitute land confiscated from ethnic Hungarians under the Beneš Decrees (Michael Shafir, “When 
Four Times Five Might Equal Zero,” RFE/RL Newsline, 24 August 1999). 
121 Two SDK ministers (Telecommunications and Economy) have also resigned due to scandals. 
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Coalition, which are threatening to result in a full-scale government crisis.122 Threats 
are also coming from the outside, as Meciar has made various attempts to destabilise 
the government by negotiating with government coalition members, calling for early 
elections, asking for Csáky to be dismissed, etc.  The Hungarian Coalition Party is 
therefore unlikely to leave the government as any split in the coalition might facilitate 
Meciar’s return.  SMK wants to be seen as a democratic and stable coalition partner 
and, although it was clearly dissatisfied with the 1999 language law, it has renewed its 
full support for the coalition government in 2000. 123 It also does not want to be seen 
as hindering Slovakia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.  In short, despite recent 
improvements in democratic government, there are still doubts concerning the future 
of democracy in Slovakia as long as personal rivalries dictate politics and as long as 
HZDS is acting in the background to destabilise the government.124 This in turn might 
present a serious obstacle to Slovakia’s membership in the EU.125  
 
While Meciar has blamed domestic and foreign villains for Slovakia’s problems, the 
current government will have to perform on many fronts, not least the economic one, 
to show that the “price” paid for turning towards the West (perceived concessions to 
minorities and ceding a degree of national sovereignty to central institutions in 
Brussels) is worthwhile.126  And there is not much time: the next parliamentary 
                                               
122 SDK was supposed to disband after the elections.  When SDK Chairman Dzurinda refused to do so, 
this led to a confrontation with Justice Minister Ján Carnogurský (also KDH Chairman) (Chris 
Tognieri, “Domestic Politics,” The Slovak Spectator, 20-26 December 1999). On 17 January 2000, 
Dzurinda announced the creation of a new political party, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union 
(SDKU),  which would probably replace the SDK in the 2002 parliamentary elections. Carnogurský 
was the first to speak out against this initiative which has KDH members equally split (Jolyon Naegele, 
“Slovak Premier Announces Controversial New Party,” RFE/RL Newsline, 24 January 2000). 
123 Statement by Pál Csáky on 5 January 2000 on Radio Slovakia International (see Hungarian Human 
Rights Monitor).  
124 Meciar has been manoeuvring within the limits of legality, to break the government coalition and to 
call a referendum on early elections.  Also, in August 1999, HZDS submitted a motion to oust Csáky 
by blaming him for the exodus of Roma because he was too preoccupied with Hungarian minority 
issues; only 40 out of the 114 deputies present voted for this motion (“Slovak Opposition Fails to Oust 
Minister,” RFE/RL Newsline, 26 August 1999). 
125 The EU has said that lack of political stability might be a “critical obstacle” to Slovakia’s bid to join 
(“EU says political stability needed in Slovakia”, RFE/RL Newsline 21 March 2000). 
126 At present, public support for EU membership is steadily rising, from 62% in January 1999 to 70% 
in March 2000, support is highest in the youngest age category (18-24), and as the level of education 
increases; in terms of party affiliation, 80-90% of supporters of the government coalition parties are for 
EU membership, against only 47% of HZDS voters and 55% of SNS voters  (opinion poll dated 27 
March 2000 by the Slovak Institute for Public Affairs, at: http://www.ivo.sk/showvyskum.asp?Id=66). 
Support for NATO membership is much lower, at 42% only 
(http://www.ivo.sk/showvyskum.asp?Id=67). 
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elections will be held in 2002 and, although the SDK still remains the most popular 
party, it is closely followed by HZDS and the new party of former SDL member 
Robert Fico: SMER (“direction”).127  
 
In conclusion, even though the practical issue of minority language use has not been 
solved by this new legislation, prospects for improved inter-ethnic relations and 
democracy in Slovakia, as well as for Slovak-Hungarian relations, are good.  But the 
main challenges are yet to come.  It remains to be seen whether the government will 
take concrete and lasting steps to build a plural democratic state where ethnic and 
linguistic differences will not only be tolerated but will also be valued as contributing 
to the cultural wealth and diversity of the country, in the interest of interethnic 
relations and stability in the country and in the region as a whole.  
 
 
                                               
127 According to recent polls, SMER would capture 12% of votes in the 2002 parliamentary elections, 
compared to 12.4% for SDK and 25.8% for HZDS (Chris Tognieri, “Domestic Politics,” The Slovak 
Spectator, 20-26 December 1999).  
 54
REFERENCES 
 
 
Bakker, Edwin (1997). Minority Conflicts in Slovakia and Hungary ? Capelle a/d Ijissel: 
 Labyrint. 
Bakker, Edwin (1998). “Growing Isolation: political and ethnic tensions in the Slovak 
 Republic.” Helsinki Monitor 9: 1, pp. 23-36.  
Connor, Walker (1994).  “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a … ”  
 In: John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism. Oxford Readers. 
 Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 36-46. 
European Roma Rights Center (1997). Time of the Skinheads – Denial and Exclusion of Roma 
 in Slovakia, Country Reports Series No. 3, January. 
Fisher, Sharon (1995a). “Treaty Fails to End Squabbles Over Hungarian Relations.” 
 Transition 1:9, 9 June, pp. 2-7.   
Fisher, Sharon (1995b). “An Education System in Chaos.” Transition 1:16, 8 September,  
 pp. 44-49. 
Fisher, Sharon (1995c). “Ethnic Hungarians Back Themselves Into a Corner.” Transition 
 1(24), 29 December, pp. 58-63.   
Fisher, Sharon, and Zsofia Szilagyi (1996). “Hungarian Minority Summit Causes Uproar in 
 Slovakia.” OMRI Analytical Brief #223.   
Fisher, Sharon (1996a). “Making Slovakia More ‘Slovak’.” Transition 2:24, 29 November,  
 pp. 14-17.   
Fisher, Sharon (1996b). “Slovak Government Clamps down on Culture.” Transition 2: 24, 29 
 November, pp. 57-59. 
Gál, Kinga (1999). Bilateral Agreements in Central and Eastern Europe: A New Inter-State 
 Framework for Minority Protection? ECMI Working Paper No. 4. Flensburg: 
 European Centre for Minority Issues, May. 
Gyurcsík, Iván (1998). “Basic Treaties, Minority Issues and the Enlargement of the European 
 Union (Case Studies: Hungary, Romania, Slovakia).” Regio 1998, pp. 9-69. 
Harlig, Jeffrey (1997). “National Consolidation vs European Integration: The Language Issue 
 in Slovakia.” Security Dialogue 28:4, pp. 479-491. 
Information Centre of the Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia (1997). The Hungarians in 
 Slovakia. Bratislava: Information Centre of the Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia. 
Kontra, Miklós (1995/1996). “English Only’s Cousin: Slovak Only.” Acta Linguistica 
 Hungarica 43: 3-4, pp. 345-372.  
Kontra, Miklós (1996). “The War over Names in Slovakia.” Language Problems and 
 Language Planning 20:2, Summer, pp. 160-167. 
 55
Kontra, Miklós (1999). “Some Reflections on the Nature of Language and its Regulation.” 
 International Journal of Minority and Group Rights 6:3, pp. 281-288.  
Liégeois, Jean-Pierre, and Nicolae Gheorghe (1995). Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority. 
 London: Minority Rights Group.  
Lijphart, Arendt (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New 
 Haven: Yale University Press.  
McGarry, John, and  Brendan O’Leary (eds.) (1993). “Introduction: the macro -political 
 regulation of ethnic conflict.” In: John McGarry and  Brendan O’Leary (eds.), The 
 Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 1 -40. 
Minority Protection Association (1996). The Slovak State Language Law and the 
 Minorities –  Critical Analyses and Remarks. Minority Protection Series 1. 
Budapest: Kossuth  Publishing.  
Minority Rights Group International (ed.) (1997). “Slovakia”. In: World Directory of 
 Minorities. London: Minority Rights Group International, pp. 245 -247. 
Bútora, Martin, Zora Bútorová et al. (1998). National Human Development Report Slovakia 
 1998. Bratislava: UNDP. 
Podoba, Juraj (1997). “Between Rancour and Cooperation. Ethnic Conflict in Slovakia.” 
 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 4:3-4, pp. 279-287. 
Reisch, Alfred (1993). “Slovakia’s Minority Policy Under International Scrutiny.” 
 RFE/RL Research Report 2:49, 10 December 1993, pp. 35-42.   
Reiter, József (1999) “A szlovákiai Magyar Koalíció Pártja kormányzati tevékenységének 
 elsö négy hónapja” (“The first four months of the Hungarian Coalition in 
 government.”) Magyar Kisebbség 1/1999. 
Schöpflin, George (1996).  “Aspects of Language and Ethnicity in Central and Eastern 
 Europe.” Transition 2: 24, 29 November, pp. 6-9, 64.    
Šedivý, Vladimír and Viktor Maroši (1995). The Situation of National Minorities and Ethnic
 Groups in the Slovak Republic. Bratislava: Minority Rights Group-Slovakia. 
Szilagyi, Zsofia (1996). “Hungarian Minority Summit Causes Uproar in the Region.” 
Transition 2:18, 6 September, pp. 45-48. 
Taras, Ray (1998). “Nations and Language-Building: Old Theories, Contemporary 
Cases.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 4(3), pp. 79-101. 
Trier, Tom (ed.) (1999).  Focus on the Rusyns. International Colloquium on the Rusyns of 
 East  Central Europe. Copenhagen: The Danish Cultural Institute. 
Wolchik, Sharon (1997). “Democratization and political participation in Slovakia.” In: Karen 
 Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), The consolidation of democracy in East-Central 
 Europe. Authoritarianism and Democratization in Postcommunist Societies 1. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 197-244.   
 56
Wolf, Karol (1998). Podruhé a naposled, aneb mírové delení Ceskoslovenska [For the second 
 and the last time, or the peaceful break-up of Czechoslovakia - in Czech]. Prague:  
 G plus G. 
Žitný, Milan (1998). “Slovakia: Party of ‘Pure Slovak Blood’.” Transitions 5:7, July,  
 pp. 37-38. 
 
Internet Sources: 
 
Central Europe Review      www.ce-review.org 
European Roma Rights Center     www.errc.org 
Hungarian Minorities Monitor  
(published by the Human Rights Foundation, it provides a digest of news on Hungarian 
minorities on a country-by-country basis, based on various sources.)     
       www.hhrf.org/monitor  
 
MINELRES (Minority Electronic Resources)   www.riga.lv/minelres 
 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities - Recommendations to Slovakia  
      www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/recomm/slovak  
 
RFE/RL Newsline (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty) www.rferl.org/newsline 
 
RomNews Network (RNN)     www.RomNews.com 
 
Rusyn News and Information Service  
 www.legacyrus.com/NewsReel/RusynNews 
 
The Slovak Spectator       www.slovakspectator.sk 
 
Slovak Government      www.government.gov.sk 
 
Slovak Ministry of Culture      www.culture.gov.sk  
 
Slovakia.org - The Guide to the Slovak Republic  www.lisiak.net/slovakia   
 
SME (Slovak daily)      www.sme.sk 
 
U.S. State Department  - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
 http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/ hrp_reports_mainhp.html 
 57
ANNEXES 
 
TABLE 1.1: NATIONAL MINORITIES IN SLOVAKIA BY ETHNICITY 
  (derived from the 1991 Czechoslovak Census) 
 
 
Ethnicity Total number % 
Slovak 4,590,100 85.7 
Hungarian 568,714 10.6 
Romany* 83,988 1.6 
Bohemian 51,293 1 
Ruthenian 17,277 0.3 
Ukrainian 14,341 0.3 
German 5,380 0.1 
Moravian, Silesian 6,361 0.1 
Croatian 4,000 0.07 
Jewish 3,500 0.06 
Polish 3,039 0.05 
Bulgarian 1,400 0.02 
Others 6,814 0.1 
Total 5,356,207 100.00 
 
Source: Report submitted by the Slovak Republic pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Received on 4 May 1999, pp. 6-7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
* The estimated number of Roma is 350,000 to 520,000 persons (6.5-9.7%). 
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TABLE 1.2: NATIONAL MINORITIES IN SLOVAKIA BY ETHNICITY AND MOTHER  
 TONGUE  (derived from the 1991 Czechoslovak census) 
 
Ethnicity Number % Mother/ 
Native tongue 
% 
Slovaks 4,519,328 85.7 4,445,303 84.3 
Czechs 59,326 1.1 56,487 1.1 
Hungarians 567,296 10.7 608,221 11.5 
Germans 5,414 0.1 7,738 0.1 
Ruthenians, Ukrainians 30,478 0.6 58,579 1.1 
Others** 92,493 1.8 98,007 1.9 
Total population 5,274,335 100 5,274,335 100 
Source: The Slovak State Language Law and the Minorities – Critical Analyses and Remarks. Minority 
Protection Series 1. Budapest: Minority Protection Association, 1996.  
 
 
TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF MIXED MUNICIPALITIES, BY PROPORTION OF  
  HUNGARIAN-SPEAKERS (1991 DATA) 
 
Proportion of 
Hungarian speakers  
Number of 
municipalities 
Number of 
Hungarians per 
municipality 
Percentage of all 
of Slovakia’s 
Hungarians 
90% and over 177 138,244 26.32 
80-90% 101 118,522 22.57 
70-80% 63 75,845 14.44 
60-70% 52 82,030 15.62 
50-60% 42 25,502 4.86 
40-50% 24 21,574 4.11 
30-40% 26 35,925 6.84 
20-30% 17 12,397 2.36 
10-20% 21 12,369 2.36 
< 10%* 19 2,777 0.53 
Total 542 525,185 100 
 
Source: The Slovak State Language Law and the Minorities – Critical Analyses and Remarks. Minority 
Protection Series 1. Budapest: Minority Protection Association, 1996.  
                                               
** The estimated number of Romanes speakers is 245,000 to 365,000 persons (4.6-6.2%). 
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TABLE 3.1: 1990 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS – SLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL 
   (Minimum threshold for a single party: 3%) 
 
 
Political parties % votes No. seats 
VPN 29.34 48 
KDH 19.20 31 
SNS 13.94 22 
KSS 13.34 22 
ESWMK 8.66 14 
DS 4.39 7 
SZ 3.48 6 
SD 1.81 - 
SSL 1.77 - 
SZV 2.51 - 
CSS 0.03 - 
SB 0.09 - 
VDS 0.20 - 
CSDF 0.01 - 
HCSP 0.39 - 
DURS 0.73 - 
VDSPR 0.21 - 
Source: Wolchik 1997: 210 
 
VPN: Public Against Violence; KDH: Christian Democratic Movement; SNS: 
Slovak National Party; KSS: Communist Party of Slovakia; ESWMK: Coexistence 
+ Hungarian Christian Democratic Party; DS: Democratic Party; SZ: Green Party; 
SD: Social Democratic Party; SSL: Freedom Party; SZV: The Alliance of Farmers; 
CSS: Czechoslovak Socialist Party; SB: Free Bloc; VDS: All-People’s Democratic 
Party; CSDF: Czechoslovak Democratic Forum; HCSP: Movement of 
Czechoslovak Understanding; DURS: Romanies; VDSPR: People’s Democratic 
Party-Rally for the Republic.    
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TABLE 3.2: 1992 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS – SLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL* 
   (Minimum threshold for a single party: 5%) 
 
Political parties % votes No. seats 
HZDS 37.3 74 
SDL 14.7 39 
KDH 8.9 18 
SNS 7.9 15 
MKDH 7.42 14 
SDSS 4 - 
ODU 4 - 
MOS 2.3 - 
DS 2.3 - 
Source: Wolchik 1997: 212.  
 
 
HZDS: Movement for a Democratic Slovakia; SDL: Party of the Democratic 
Left; KDH: Christian Democratic Movement; SNS: Slovak National Party; 
MKDH: Coexistence + Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement; SDSS: 
Social Democratic Party; ODU: Civic Democratic Union; MOS: Hungarian Civic 
Party; DS: Democratic Party.  
 
                                               
* In 1992, a new electoral law increased the minimum threshold for entering the Slovak National 
Council from 3 to 5%. The number for a coalition of two parties is 8%.  
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TABLE 3.3: 1994 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS – SLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL 
   (Minimum threshold for a single party: 5%) 
 
Political parties % votes No. seats 
HZDS/RSS 34.96 61 
SU 10.41 18 
MK 10.18 17 
KDH 10.08 17 
DU 8.57 15 
ZRS 7.34 13 
SNS 5.40 9 
DS 3.42 - 
KSS 2.72 - 
KSU 2.05 - 
NS 1.33 - 
SPK 1.31 - 
HZPC+S 1.05 - 
ROI 0.67 - 
SD 0.24 - 
RSDSS 0.12 - 
ZPR 0.04 - 
Source: Wolchik 1997: 213. 
 
HZDS/RSS: Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Peasant Party of Slovakia; SU: 
Common Choice coalition: Party of Democratic Left (SDL), Social-Democratic 
Party of Slovakia (SDSS), Movement of Farmers of the Slovak Republic, Green 
Party of Slovakia (SZS); MK: Hungarian Coalition: Coexistence, Hungarian 
Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH), Hungarian Civic Party (MOS); KDH: 
Christian Democratic Movement; DU: Democratic Union; ZRS: Workers’ 
Association of Slovakia; SNS: Slovak National Party; DS: Democratic Party; KSS: 
Communist Party of Slovakia; KSU: Christian-Social Union; NS: New Slovakia; 
SPK: Party against Corruption; HZPC+S: Movement for a Prosperous Czechia and 
Slovakia; ROI: Romany Civic Initiative; SD: Social Democracy; RSDSS: 
Realistic-Social Democratic Party; ZPR: Association for the Republic-Republicans.     
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TABLE 3.4: 1998 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS – SLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL 
   (Minimum threshold for a single party: 5%) 
 
Political parties % votes No. seats 
HZDS  
 
27 43 
SDK  
 
26.33 42 
SDL  
 
14.66 23 
SMK  
 
9.12 15 
SOP 
 
8.01 13 
SNS  
 
9.07 14 
Source: RFE/RL Newsline, 28 September 1998. 
 
HZDS: Movement for a Democratic Slovakia / Hnutie za demokratické 
Slovensko. 
 
SDK: Slovak Democratic Coalition / Slovenská demokratická koalícia 
- Christian Democratic Movement / Krest ansko demokratické hnutie (KDH) 
- Democratic Party / Demokratická strana (DS) 
- Democratic Union / Demokratická únia Slovenska (DU) 
- Social Democratic Party of Slovakia / Sociálnodemokratická strana 
Slovenska (SDSS) 
- Green Party / Slovenská strana zelených (SZS) 
 
SOP: Party of Civic Understanding / Strana obcianskeho porozumenia 
 
SDL: Party of Democratic Left / Strana demokratickej l’avice 
 
SMK: Hungarian Coalition Party / Magyar Koalíció Pártja (MKP)/ Strana 
mad arskej koalície (SMK) 
- Coexistence / Együtéllés / Spolužitie 
- Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement / Mad arské Krest ansko 
demokratické hnutie (MKDH) 
- Hungarian Civic Party / Mad arská obcianská strana (MOS) 
 
SNS: Slovak National Party / Slovenská národná strana 
 
